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During the last ten years, Italian growth has lagged behind
other European countries. This delay has been mainly attributed
to a slowdown in Italian firms productivity. A large body of
literature has deepened the role of finance, among other fac-
tors, in spurring economic growth. The present work investi-
gates some of these processes, through three different frame-
works.
Chapter 1 is an application of the Rajan Zingales (1998) ap-
proach to the Italian case. In this application a proxy for finan-
cial development at regional levels was built up using quali-
tative information. The results point out that the Italian finan-
cial market is still segmented at regional levels, in particular
for smaller firms that are more dependent on the proximity
of financial services. Moreover, it suggests that the effect of
financial development could be even higher assuming the ex-
ternal dependence computed on German and not U.S. listed
firms.
Chapter 2 focuses on the effectiveness of financial systems in
allocating the resources to the most efficient firms. In this
chapter, we test whether firms’ financial strategies explain the
distance of a sample of Italian firms to the efficiency frontier.
The results point out that a tighter relationship with banks or
a higher contendibility of corporate control are correlated to a
more efficient production.
Chapter 3 focuses on the effects that different financial instru-
ments have on R&D strategies and on productivity. As the
results suggest, in fact, the nature and duration of different fi-





During the last ten years, Italian growth has lagged behind other Euro-
pean countries. This delay has been mainly attributed to a slowdown in
Italian firms productivity1.
There are a number of reasons why Italy displayed such a bad perfor-
mance during the last period. First, the small dimensions of the Italian
firms, the scarce innovation and the specialization in traditional sectors
have often been quoted as causes for the hold-up.
Furthermore, Italy is still a country divided in two: the convergence pro-
cess that involved Southern regions towards Northern regions and to
more productive areas, stopped in 2002. This affected the overall pro-
ductivity, generating a structural lag for the entire country: spurring pro-
ductivity in the Southern area is a priority at a national level.
Nonetheless, the lack of competitiveness of Southern Italy seems only to
be amplifying problems common to the whole country.
Recently, empirical evidence on micro data has pointed out several
features regarding the distribution of productivity of Italian manufactur-
ing firms. Firstly, it has been relatively stable in rankings over time; in
spite of this, there seems to be a polarization process that has increased
the distance between the best and the worst performing firms on the mar-
ket.
In the last years, hence, a bulk of excellent cases left behind a bunch of
1see Daveri, F., Perche´ la produttivita´ ha smesso di crescere nell’economia italiana, Quaderni di
Ricerca Centro Studi Confindustria, n.2 Dicembre, 2006.
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firms. However, the positive results of these firms had no influence at an
aggregate level.
As suggested in a recent paper by Giannangeli and Gomes-Salvador (2008)
the contribution to aggregate productivity of individual firms’ efficiency
improvement is negative, thus implying that they are enlarging their dis-
tance from the efficiency frontier. Furthermore it is shown that more effi-
cient firms are not rewarded with an increase in their market shares. This
suggests that there is no relationship between productivity levels and
firms’ growth, evidence already described also in Bottazzi, Secchi and Ta-
magni (2006). Overall, the cited analysis indicates that Italian industries
may be structurally affected by a lack of ”virtuous” competitive mecha-
nisms able to provide incentives for firm innovation and to the adoption
of new technologies or diffusion of best practices.
A large strand of literature has highlighted the role of institutions in
representing a key factor for improving productivity also at an aggregate
level. A large body of literature has deepened the role of finance, among
other factors, in spurring economic growth. As Rajan and Zingales (1998)
have written, ”economists have emphasized the role of financial develop-
ment in better identifying investment opportunities, reducing investment
in liquid but unproductive factors, mobilizing savings, boosting techno-
logical innovation, and improving risk taking”.
All these activities can certainly contribute to generate a positive dynamic
at a micro level, having an effect also on macro results.
There are different channels through which this process takes place; the
present work investigates some of these processes, using three different
frameworks.
First of all, financial development can spur economic growth enhanc-
ing the amount of resources available to satisfy firms financing needs. The
existence of credit barriers can, in fact, reduce the opportunity for incum-
bent firms to exploit their potential through investments or innovation 2.
2for a comprehensive review of the literature on finance and growth see Papaioannou,
E. Finance and Growth: a Macroeconomic assessment of the Evidence from a Europeand Angle,
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Moreover, credit constraints can also hinder new entrants, reducing the
contendibility of the market (Aghion, Phally and Scarpetta, 2007).
The financial system not only provides the market with liquidity, but
it also handles the task to allocate to the market the collected resources.
The correct function of this process implies that the system provides more
funds to the more productive units. This increases competition and, in
principle, it should induce all firms to approach their efficiency frontier,
rising aggregate productivity.
However, an efficient allocation of the resources is not straightfor-
ward, especially when the typical market failures, as asymmetric infor-
mation and moral hazard that affect the financial markets, are particularly
significant. Transparency is necessary on the market as it is the ability to
evaluate and monitor firms by the financial system, a task which can be
particularly hard in satisfying specific needs as financing innovation (Hall
2002).
Certainly in these instances the presence of public sector is necessary,
though, in these cases, finance can be used as an instrument for stimu-
lating innovation. Public sector can in fact provide funds to innovative
firms, either directly or by facilitating the condition for financing R&D
(for example through public guarantees).
This thesis analyses these different channels, looking not at financial
development per se, but at the way in which firms approach it. In fact, the
effects finance has on firms’ performances are determined by the existing
relationship between the real and the financial sector.
The first chapter is an application of the Rajan Zingales (1998) ap-
proach to the Italian case. They have proposed a test to be applied in
verifying the effectiveness of the mechanisms through which finance af-
fects growth. As outcome, the authors provide evidence that whenever
an industry is more dependent on external finance, its growth is higher in
Working Paper Series no787, july 2007.
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more financially developed countries. Usually this approach has a cross-
country application, as it is easier to proxy financial development at in-
ternational levels. In this application a proxy for financial development
at regional levels was built up using information coming from qualita-
tive data. This proxy, generated by the principal component analysis,
combines different information to summarize the level of financial de-
velopment of different Italian regions. Clearly, it brings in a proxy for
the quantity of credit provided to the market (firms not financially con-
strained). But it also includes an indicator of capitalization (firms listed or
intending to go public) and information on the development of innova-
tive financial instruments. The results point out that the Italian financial
market is still segmented at regional levels, in particular for smaller firms
that are more dependent on the proximity of financial service suppliers.
Moreover, it suggests that the effect of financial development could be
even higher considering a more realistic setting, for example assuming
the need of external finance computed on German listed firms and not
U.S. listed ones.
Chapter 2 focuses on the effectiveness of financial systems in allocat-
ing the resources to the most efficient firms in the market. In this work,
after having shown some evidence confirming the weakness of competi-
tive pressures, we investigate this issue looking at the distance from the
efficient frontier (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti 2003) of a wide sample
of Italian firms. Furthermore, I will assess the historical movement of this
distance and try to give an interpretation of the role played by the finan-
cial system.
In principle, the selection activity of financial markets should, in fact, in-
duce firms to work as closely as possible towards the efficiency frontier.
However, this process works only if the relationship firms share with the
financial sector is sufficiently strong in order to allow financial institu-
tions to evaluate and monitor the business activity.
In this paper, we test whether firms’ financial strategies explain their dis-
tance to the efficiency frontier. In principle, either a bank based system or
a market based system can produce positive effects in terms of growth:
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as some authors highlight, there is in fact no clear ranking in terms of
efficiency between the two (Levine 1999). Through the above mentioned
process of resource reallocation, finance can thus provide the right incen-
tives to the corporate sector.
Hence, in this work both the relationship with banks or with capital mar-
kets are taken into account as variables driving firms’ efficiency.
The results point out that a tighter relationship with banks or a higher
contendibility of corporate control are correlated to a more efficient pro-
duction. From a policy point of view, this suggests that the relationship of
Italian firms with financial markets are still characterized by asymmetric
information that do not facilitate the monitoring on performances. In-
creasing the transparency of firm activity and better enabling the selec-
tion role of financing activity, can be a way for fostering efficiency in the
market, and through this, aggregate productivity.
The last Chapter focuses on the effects that different financial instru-
ments have on R&D strategies and, hence, on productivity. In this case,
finance is evaluated as a policy tool to increase firms competitiveness. In
a period during which the policy aiming at promoting innovative activity
are considered a priority, also at international levels, it is particularly im-
portant to understand how financial instruments impact R&D strategic
choices.
The effect of different financing instruments on the innovative activity is,
in fact, not straightforward. The nature and duration of different finan-
cial instruments could have an impact on firm innovation strategies. In
the presence of financial barriers, the instruments become a driver for the
firms’ choices in terms of R&D.
The analysis has been carried on through a two step approach: first, the
role of financial instruments on R&D choices is assessed, second, the dif-
ferent impact of these strategies on productivity is evaluated.
Once a firm has decided to invest in research, it has, indeed, to decide
whether to produce internally or to outsource the research activity. In
the second step, the effect of alternative strategies on productivity dis-
tribution is assessed, using quantile regression to evaluate the impact on
xxii
different percentiles.
All in all, the results suggest that different financial instruments have an
impact on the firms’ R&D choices and, as a consequence, on productivity.
As seen, alternative instruments can provide incentives to different sec-
tors. Being aware of this could be relevant for choosing policy tools for
spurring innovation.
In conclusion, the overall work shows that a direct, transparent and
stable relationship with financial market can be particularly helpful in
increasing the productivity of the real economy. A well tailored relation-
ship, could indeed help to remove barriers and constraints that could pre-
vent the firms from operating with the best possible structure in terms of
technology, size etc. On the other hand, if the financial market could at
best play a monitoring role, it could allow a correct systemic allocation
of resources (to their best possible uses). The typical financial system in-
termediary action favours the matching between available savings and
financial needs. Moreover it could provide the right incentives to the
firms in order to maximize performance and long term value. Finally,
longer financial instruments allow firms to use the innovation strategy





Regional Impact on Growth
1.1 Introduction
The role of financial development in spurring economic growth has been
at the center of economic debate for many years. In particular, until the
seminal contribution of Rajan and Zingales (1998, RZ henceforth), one
of the key questions was the definition of the causality direction of the
finance-growth nexus. RZ proposed a test to assess the effectiveness of
the mechanism through which finance affects growth, and provided evi-
dence that whenever an industry is more dependent on external finance
(because of technological reasons), its growth increases disproportionatly
when the financial system is more developed.
This finding has encouraged many researchers to use micro data in
evaluating the impact of financial development on aggregate growth.
Studies on this topic are typically based on cross country data. Finan-
cial markets are, in fact, becoming more and more integrated at interna-
tional level, increasing the interest in understanding the effect of this pro-
cess on different economies. The adoption of unified international rules
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can, in fact, contribute not only to making the internationalization process
easier, but also to raising growth in less financially developed countries,
therefore, promoting at large international convergence.
However, even in markets that are rapidly becoming global, local fi-
nancial development still matters, as Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004)
clearly show in a study focusing on the Italian market. In Italy, in par-
ticular, local development seems to play a relevant role since firms are
smaller on average and depend on the proximity of financial institution
for satisfying their financing needs. During the last years, the differences
among Italian regions have gradually increased, at least in terms of eco-
nomic growth. The aim of the paper is to understand how much of this
gap is to attribute to different levels of local financial development, and
whether the process of concentration in the banking industry during the
90’s has spurred financial development within regions.
To this end, I first applied the RZ methodology to a sample of firms lo-
cated in all Italian regions. In particular, I tested whether firms operating
in financially developed regions are causally related with higher growth
rates in the sectors more dependent on external finance. The proxy for
regional financial development has been built up using survey data from
the UniCredit database (ex MedioCredito Centrale): this allows us to con-
sider not only the quantity of credit on the market, but also other aspects
such as the use of innovative financial instruments or the role of capital
markets.
I used a model well fitting the effect of financial development on firms
growth also to test whether the process of concentration that took place in
banking industry during the nineties has improved the financial integra-
tion and development of Italian regions and has positively affected eco-
nomic growth. Then, I removed the RZ hypothesis that U.S. listed firms
financial dependence represent well the need of external finance of differ-
ent industries across countries. The characteristics of Italian firms are, in
fact, significantly different from those of U.S. firms, in terms of adopted
technology as well as average firms’ size. The structural differences be-
tween the two economies can affect the financial dependence of Italian
2
industries. Using a variable for external dependence that better approxi-
mates the financing needs of Italian firms - in particular the external needs
of German firms- may better capture the role of financial development in
spurring economic growth. Finally, following Guiso Jappelli Padula and
Pagano, I quantified the effects of an increase in the financial develop-
ment on the different Italian regions and on the different industries, to
understand the policy implications that the analysis provides.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews part of the
literature related to the finance and growth nexus; Section 3 describes the
Italian financial system and its origins, in the light of the policy effects on
regional financial development; Section 4 finally describes the empirical
results of the analysis.
1.2 Review of the Literature
There is a long debate in the economic literature on how financial de-
velopment affects economic growth: from Shumpeter onwards (1911), in
fact, many economists concentrated their attention on this topic. In this
section I will survey some relevant contributions.
As suggested by Goldsmith (1969), the main difficulty in the analy-
sis of the finance-growth links is to assess the causality direction. The
difficulty is to establish whether financial development spurs economic
growth, or, vice versa, economic growth gives an impulse to financial in-
stitution, which have to adequate their supply to the demand of financial
services.
All in all, the empirical evidence suggests that finance can contribute pos-
itively to economic growth.
There are many empirical works, analyzing the finance-growth nexus at
country-level, industry-level and firm-level, using different econometric
techniques to control for the possible feedback effect indicated by Gold-
smith.
One of the first papers that tried to consider the endogeneity problem
is written by King and Levine (1993a). They studied whether financial de-
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velopment has a significant impact on economic growth using data from
80 countries over the period from 1960 to 1989.
They obtained two sets of findings. Firstly, financial development is strongly
and robustly correlated with growth, even using different measurement
of financial development; secondly, financial system development stimu-
lates growth not just by increasing the physical capital accumulation, but
also improving the efficiency in credit allocation.
To overcome the reverse causality problem they used data for financial
development taken at the beginning of the period of analysis to explain
the subsequent growth and the sources of it. However, this technique
does not solve the endogeneity problem completely. In fact both vari-
ables can be driven by omitted factors. For example, we can think about
the household’s propensity to save: if this is high, then it affects both the
long run growth and the financial development, becoming the a driver
for both the variables.
Moreover it is not completely convincing that temporal precedence nec-
essarily implies causality: in fact, it could also be that financial markets
are simply anticipating economic growth.
Also Levine and Zervos (1998) studied the topics analyzing a cross
section of countries. They empirically investigated the relationship be-
tween stock market liquidity, size, volatility, and integration with world
capital markets and current and future growth, capital accumulation and
productivity. Their paper extends the King and Levine analysis of bank-
ing and growth to include measures of the financial market functioning.
The idea is to find out whether with growth there is a correlation between
both banking and stock market indicators: this implies that banks and
stock markets have an independent empirical connection with contem-
poraneous and long run economic growth.
However, even this work cannot avoid the possible criticism made to
the King and Levine analysis. In the cross country based analysis, the
key point is to find instruments that can be considered completely exoge-
nous: Beck et al. (2000), following La Porta et al. (1998), use the legal
origin of the financial system to find out the relationship with the eco-
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nomic growth. Again they find that the size of the financial system is
positively and robustly correlated with economic growth.
Another approach was instead conducted by Jayaratne and Strahan
(1996); to avoid the omitted variable problem they considered a situation
in which an institutional reform changes the financial market structure
keeping everything else constant.
Thus they studied the intrastate branch banking reform that took place
in the United States between 1972 and 1991. They found that this was a
big improvement in the efficiency of the banking system because less ef-
ficient banks were removed in favor of larger organizations. This led to a
reduction of costs associated with a better monitoring of loans.
Once more, their methodology does not avoid the causality problem; how-
ever, the authors argued that in case growth causes financial develop-
ment, a large increase in the loan lending after the deregulation should
have occurred. But this was not the case. Thus it turns out that the quality
of the loans increased after deregulation, not the quantity and it suggests
that the economic growth followed the intrastate branch reform and not
vice versa.
A part of the most recent literature, however, has focused attention
not on the country-level, rather on the industry-level or firm-level data to
understand the impact and the channels through which financial markets
development spurs economic growth.
One of the most relevant papers in this literature is written by RZ (1998):
they analyzed the differential effects of various measures of financial de-
velopment on economic growth from different sectors.
Moreover, they argued that a more financially developed system helps to
avoid the problem of asymmetric information and adverse selection re-
ducing the firm’s costs to raise funds. So, in principle, industries that are
more dependent on external financing should grow more in financially
developed countries.
This kind of methodology has two big advantages:
- It looks at the mechanism through which financial markets affect
the industry growth, and this prevents any question about causal-
ity;
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- It controls the countries fixed effects and, as in Jayarathne Strahan,
avoids the problem of possible omitted variables.
The test is constructed as follows. First of all, assuming that the United
States market is the one characterized by the smallest number of frictions,
a measure for the need of U.S. firms external finance is created.
Then, assuming the existence of technological reasons - common to ev-
ery country - such that some industries depend more on external finance
than others, the authors examine whether in more financially developed
countries these industries develop more rapidly.
One possible problem with this methodology is that financial develop-
ment can affect the industrial specialization of the country, creating a bias
in estimating the rate of growth of an industry in which the country is
specialized.
The inclusion of the industry share of value added at the beginning of
period can be sufficient in accounting for this bias. Guiso, Iappelli, Padula
and Pagano (2004), for example, use this corrected methodology to esti-
mate the European growth dividend generated by financial integration at
an industry-level and a firm-level data. Overall the results confirm the
previous researches indicating that financial development is positive and
significant correlated with growth differentials. Moreover the authors try
to evaluate the benefits reached by the countries simulating two possible
future scenarios that differ depending on the level of financial integration
achieved.
The results indicate that financial integration will have a positive effect on
countries and sector’s growth, but the magnitude of this effect will not be
equal for every country.
However, even if in the last decades this pace of integration has been
very fast, a work by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004, from now GSZ)
suggests that local financial development still matters for growth. While
in Guiso, Iappelli, Padula and Pagano (2004) the key point is to evaluate
the differential in terms of growth, generated by an increase in the inte-
gration process inside the European Union, GSZ (2004) shows that also
the EU’s national financial development will matter in the foreseeable fu-
ture.
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To understand the relevance of national financial institution GSZ (2004)
concentrates the analysis on regions inside a single country, Italy, which
has been unified from both a regulatory and a political point of view for
the last 140 years. Since the level of integration reached in this country
can be considered an upper bound, it is interesting to verify whether, in
Italy, there is relevance of financial development for regional growth or
not. To test the proposition, the authors constructed an indicator for local
financial development and they found it has a strong effect on growth. To
deal with endogeneity of financial development, they instrumented this
indicator with variables that described the regional characteristics of the
banking system as of 1936. All the evidence suggests that local financial
development plays an important role in determining the growth of Italian
regions.
1.3 Italian Banking System
As suggested in Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2004), the Italian market has
many peculiarities and it is interesting to extend the finance-growth nexus
analysis to this country. This section describes the legal evolution of the
Italian financial system and its main characteristics.
1.3.1 Historical Evolution
From an historical point of view there have been four phases in the evo-
lution of the Italian banking system from the unification of Italy (1861)
onward:
• 1860-1926, from the unification to the first general banking law;
• 1926-1936 from the first to the second general banking law
• 1936-1985 no structural changes affected the banking system un-
til the communitarian directive 350/1985, which imposed a reform
over the sector
• From 1985 a renovation of the entire financial system has taken
place, due to the transposition of the Communitarian directive in
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the Italian juridical system that started the liberalization up of the
entire financial system.
Below the principles introduced in this last period with respect to the
previous ones are described.
The second general law was introduced to protect the financial sys-
tem from the possible instabilities and market failures. Therefore banks
were not considered as productive firms, but as institutions which had
to be controlled by political authorities who would be able to prevent an
economical crisis1. This implied an extremely high level of political inter-
vention in this field of the economy.
The institution demanded to control the sector was, in fact, the CICR
(Comitato Interministeriale per il Credito e il Risparmio), a special commit-
tee formed by economic ministries and the Bank of Italy governor. This
institution had to decide on the entry of new firms in the market and
to verify their organizational structure as well as their dimensions in the
country. During the 1940s these tasks were definitively given to the Bank
of Italy. Anyway the authority maintained the political role and so the
market had the characteristics of an oligopoly in which competition just
had a marginal importance, while the political power had a really strong
influence.
Moreover the market was limited due to the high level of specializa-
tion of the banks:
1. Short term and long term loans could not be provided by the same
bank, and these two types of operations were regulated by different
laws;
2. There were territorial limitation due to the very rigid rules for open-
ing new branches; moreover just a few categories of banks could
operate at country level. In particular, national banks could open
branches only in the main cities, cooperative banks only within the
province and saving banks within the region in which they operated
(Guiso Sapienza Zingales, 2004);
1See Costi (2001)
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3. Some banks were specialized in providing credit just for one par-
ticular industrial sector. For example the Casse Rurali and Casse
dell’Artigianato were supposed to finance the agricultural and the
artesian sectors;
During the 1980s new financial instruments were developed and the Eu-
ropean directive introduced an higher level of competition due to the mu-
tual recognition of the bank licenses regulated by the European Commu-
nity. For the first time the d.l. no 350, 27 June 1985 applied the directive
in the Italian legal system and it has been be definitively implemented in
the Testo Unico dell’intermediazione Finanziaria (T.U.F.) introduced in 1993.
One of the fundamental principles is the mutual acknowledgment,
stating that any communitarian bank can establish a branch in Italy, granted
that they continue to remain under the supervision of their original au-
thority.
Since this implies an higher level of competition in the sector, the state
had to deregulate the financial system to permit Italian banks to compete
at an international level.
First of all, the T.U.F. eliminated the political aims of the regulatory
institution and their possible discretionary applications of the law. The
institutions have to adequate their activity to the decisions taken at EU
level. This permits an instantaneous application of the communitarian
regulation in the Italian system.
Moreover, the T.U.F. deregulated the sector by eliminating the special-
ization of bank activities and introducing the liberalization of the branch
location.
In fact, from that moment onward there was no longer distinction be-
tween long and short credit and the banks could enlarge their business.
Furthermore, with the second banking law, rigid limits were imposed to
the opening of new branches and extending credit. While with the intro-
duction of 1985’s law, the authorization became granted unless explicitly
denied, so the number of branches on the territories could grow by 79
percent in ten years.
9
1.3.2 Effects of Law Evolution on Financial Efficiency
The changes with financial laws during the last century have affected the
development of financial systems for the entire country.
The banking structure of 1936 was the result of the policy applied after
the economical crisis of 1930 -1931, so it was not determined by market
forces. As we have already seen, the 1936 law introduced the task for
Bank of Italy to permit banks to enter the market. However, the bank of
Italy used this authority to evaluate the market stability rather than mar-
ket efficiency.
Therefore the number of branches for inhabitants was not due to the ac-
tual necessity of the area, but to the political decision of the central bank
2.
In summary, the financial system regulation that was introduced in
1936 stopped the natural evolution of the system preventing the pro-
gression with the banking market structure. This implied that regions
in which there was a higher presence of bank branches, grew more than
others 3.
Moreover Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004) showed that not only
the quantities, but also the typology of banks implied different level of
growth: regions in which local banks were operating tended to grow less
than region with an higher diffusion of national banks.
In particular the second general law favored more saving banks than
the others, and this determined that this typology could extend more of
its business. This also determined the level of financial development and
the growth in the provinces in which the banks operated.
Furthermore, this effect had a long-term ramification: in more financially
developed regions in 1936, the cost of credit in 1985 was lower than in
other regions4.
2 It is easy to show that this number was not correlated with the economic development,
as shown in Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004.
3In fact if we look at the banking structure in 1985 we notice that it was determined by
that of 1936. For example, the number of branches per inhabitants in 1985 were correlated
with that of 1936 (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004).
4The results are confirmed if we consider the availability of the credit: consistently with
what we just argued more loans were provided in more financially developed regions, cre-
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Hence the different local specialization of financial institutions deter-
mined a different level of regional growth; in particular, the Southern area
was penalized by its financial structure 5. Moreover the market segmen-
tation has remained a characteristic of the Italian market. In fact, local
financial development still matters in determining the level of growth.
In particular, Guiso Sapienza, Zingales (2004) showed that local financial
development not only has affected a firm’s creation, but also the firm’s
growth. Hence, even after 140 years from the Italian unification local
financial development matters, determining the regional differentials in
terms of growth.
1.4 A Look at Regional Growth and Current Fi-
nancial Trends
Regional data, either aggregate or at firm level, confirm that within Ital-
ian regions market differences are still present. The Southern regions,
which were converging to the Northern growth results, are, from 2002
onward, again widening the distance with respect to the most productive
regions. After a particularly favorable 2001 (during which the Mezzo-
giorno growth was 2.3% versus a 1.8% national growth), in the following
four years the annual growth in the South of Italy was 0.3% versus 0.6%
in the North and a 1.2% in the Centre. Data for 2006 confirm this trend,
and recently updated data relative to 2007 show an even increasing gap,
with a growth rate of 0.7% in the South and a growth rate of 1.5% for Italy.
This process reflects an increasing lack of competitiveness also at firm lev-
els. Firms profitability, in fact, has been reducing: from the balance sheet
data of a sample composed by around 5000 firms6 it shows that from 2002
Return on Equity in the South and the Islands was around 7.7% against
9.4% in the Center, 16.3% in the North East and 13% in the North West.
Furthermore in the South this index has been decreasing quite rapidly.
Structural balance sheet indicators suggest that, on average, southern
firms financial structure is weaker than in other areas. Even if leverage is
ating relevant differences within the country. See Guiso, Sapienza, Zingales (2004)

















Figure 1: GDP growth rate by area
more balanced, it does not seem to indicate an explicit firms’ choice: other
financial indices, in fact, reveal a unbalanced structure. Banking debt in
this area is particularly unbalanced, i.e. most of the debt is short term.
Between 2004 and 2007, for example, in the South short term banking debt
was 71.4% of banking debt versus a 65.8% of Italy. The relationship with
banking systems seems, hence, not to be a long term process, in which
long term business projects are evaluated for determining the financing
needs of firms. On the contrary, trade debt, in the South, is particularly
high, indicating that a use of the intra-firms relationship is more similar
to a financing source: trade debt increased in the South from 35.6% of
total debt in 2003 to 47.6% in 2007. This suggests that financing needs are
satisfied in this area using alternatives to financial systems. Effectively,
even if the growth rate of funding is higher in the South of Italy (between
2004 and 2007 the non financial corporation loans have been 12% versus
explained by the effects of banking restriction imposed in 1936’.
6This sample reflects the universe of Italian firms. The herein described balance sheet
indices are calculated on Aida database.
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a total of 8.6%), the total quantity still remains well below other areas in
the country. These evidences suggest that some differences still remain at
regional level and affect growth rate in the areas. Part of this differential
can be explained by the development of Italian financial system, and by
its recent evolution.
How much this impacts the increasing divergence is one of the question
this paper intends to answer.
1.5 Estimating within Country Effects of Finan-
cial Development
The purpose of this work is to analyze the relationship between Italian
financial systems and economic growth, as well as responding to various
questions. Are growth differentials due - at least partly - to the financial
development equal between regions, or does a market segmentation still
exist, implying differences in regional growth rates?
What part of the gap between North and South can be attributed to the
structural characteristics of the regional financial system?
And finally, has the concentration process during the 1990s induced any
change within the country’s financial development? The Rajan Zingales
methodology is used to test whether regional financial development is
statistically significant for explaining growth differentials between regions.
1.5.1 The Rajan and Zingales Method
The Rajan and Zingales methodology intends to find a test which quan-
tifies the effect of financial development on growth, while examining the
mechanism through which this can be affected.
In particular they test whether industries that are more dependent on ex-
ternal financing grow more rapidly in more financially developed coun-
tries. To test the hypothesis the following regression is run:
yi,c = β0 + β1Xi + β2Xc + β3DiFc + β4Share + ei,c (1.1)
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The endogenous variable yi,c is the value added in industry j in coun-
try i in the period from 1980 to 1990.
The explanatory variables are:
- Xi represents the industry’s dummies;
- Xc represents the country’s dummies;
- Di is a variable indicating the industry’s need for external finance; it
is multiplied by Fc which represents the country’s level of financial
development;
- Finally, a term which indicates the industry’s share of manufactur-
ing of industry i in 1980 is added;
The critical term in the regression is β3; if it is positive and statistically
significant this means that in countries with a more financially developed
system, the sectors more dependent on external finance, that are typically
more innovative, show a positive differential in productivity growth.
The basic assumption of this approach is that financial dependence is de-
termined by technical reasons, that are equal across countries. The tech-
nological frontier, hence, is determined at international levels.
The proxy for the need of external finance is then calculated for the
US capital market, considering it the more frictionless, and therefore not
affected by financial constraints. The computation is done on Standard
and Poor’s compustat data on 1980s: industries’ need for external finance
is calculated as the median of capital expenditure minus cash flows from
operations over capital expenditure. This variable is thus considered the
best proxy for financial development, and it represents the financial needs
for each industry in order to embody the activity of all available technol-
ogy.
The RZ approach, has numerous advantages:
• It eliminates the causality feedback problem, because it takes into
consideration the mechanism through which finance development
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can affect growth. In fact, if financial markets only anticipate future
growth, the coefficient β4 would not be statistically different to zero.
• It avoids the possibility of omitted variables bias or model specifi-
cation, because the country or industry variables that could affect
both growth and financial development are considered in the fixed
effect
• The industry’s share at the beginning of the period avoids the ef-
fects of the causality relationship between financial development
and countries’ sectoral specialization
1.5.2 How to apply Rajan and Zingales Methodology to
the Italian Case: Building up a Proxy for Financial
Development
Generating a proxy for financial development is one of the main open
problems in applying the Rajan and Zingales method in a within country
analysis.
Building up a variable for financial development at national level is, in
fact, not straightforward. Many structural indicators used in interna-
tional analysis, such as market capitalization, do not exist at regional lev-
els.
One possible proxy can be represented by the number of bank branches
per inhabitants in each region. In Jarathne and Strahan (1996) analysis
this variable represents the availability of credit in different regions, since
numerous States relaxed restriction on intrastate branching between 1970
and 1991, generating a structural break in the financial market develop-
ment.
However, they use this variable to assess the effect of a regulatory change
that produced an increase in the number of banks branches, but the in-
dicator per se´ does not have clear cut impact. An high number of bank
branches not necessarily, in fact, reflects a more efficient financial system.
Moreover, financial development should consider more aspects than
exclusively the quantity of liquidity banking systems provide. In this
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analysis we also want to include in the financial development proxy the
role of alternative funding.
An indicator was generated using the UniCredit survey on Italian Man-
ufacturing industries, from the information collected in a section entirely
dedicated to the relationships between firms and financial systems. The
survey, that every three years involves around 5000 firms representative
of the universe of Manufacturing Italian firms, collects information on the
entire corporate activity.
Five questions, contained in section F (finance), seem particularly use-
ful in identifying a variable, representing the financial development for
each region:
1. Did the firm need more credit during the last three years?
2. Did the firm use innovative financial instruments during the last
three years?
3. Would the firm use financial instruments in the near future?
4. Is the firm listed?
5. Will the firm be listed in the near future?
These questions provide information not only on the level of financial
constraints in each region, but also on their use of innovative financial
instruments (such as private equity and venture capital) as well as their
openness in terms of social capital. While the first question is a proxy rep-
resenting at large the quantity of banking loans in the market, the other
four questions gather information on the diffusion of other funding in-
struments. The variable representing regional financial development col-
lects all these information, exploiting many aspects of financial services
useful in enhancing their business.
The method used in generating this proxy is the Principal Component
Analysis, that helps in identifying common patterns in multiple variables,
using a procedure which reduces the dimensionality of the dataset. Prin-
cipal components are obtained by projecting the multivariate data ma-
trix on the space spanned by the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix.
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Within these, the eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue explains most
of the variability in the dataset. The first component is then extracted
to generate an indicator keeping into account different characteristics of
firms behavior of our sample, that explains the development of financial
institution for each area.
Let Xt be the matrix containing the data: each line refers to one re-
gion and each column refers to one specific variable. The entries are com-
posed by the percentage of positive responses over the total number in-
terviewed, except for the first question that was included as proportion of
negative responses over the total. Define Γ = cov(Xt), λi the i-th eigen-
value (in descending order) of Γ and Vi the corresponding eigenvector.
Principal components were computed as:
PC(Xt) = Xt ∗V1.
The result is a variable that seems to well represent differences be-
tween geographical areas. To evaluate its representativeness, it is com-
pared with other variables which can partly proxy the Italian financial
system. Finally, the simple average of the variables used in the financial
development construction is shown as a benchmark case.
Looking at Table 1, the first variable is the one considered in Guiso Sapienza
and Zingales (2004), generated using the Survey on Households Income
and Wealth (Bank of Italy SHIW), the second is the total non financial cor-
poration loan over GDP by region: the pairwise correlation coefficient is
in both cases high and significant. The correlation with GSZ variable is
0.644 and is significant at 1%, while the correlation with loans over re-
gional GDP, is at 74.6%, and is again significant at 1%.
The first variable used in generating our proxy is, effectively, strictly re-
lated with the other two, since it represents the number of firms in each
region which are not financially constrained7. Hence it can easily be as-
similated to the total supply of credit in the area, and also, to the financial
constraints of the household sector, as in Guiso Sapienza and Zingales
(2004). However, the variable used herein has the advantage of being
7The principal component analysis moreover, suggest that the presence of financial con-
straints is the variable that explains most part of the total variance.
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Regions Principal Simple Guiso et al. Loans
Component Average (2004) /GDP
Abruzzo 0.791 0.192 0.359 186.2
Basilicata 0.608 0.138 0.347 133.74
Calabria 0.592 0.161 0 72.796
Campania 0.664 0.220 0.027 146.49
Emilia Romagna 0.884 0.213 0.523 335.48
Friuli 0.818 0.215 0.41 244.54
Lazio 0.777 0.198 0.067 375
Liguria 0.723 0.217 0.586 184.34
Lombardia 0.844 0.214 0.435 399.18
Marche 0.869 0.215 0.587 210.15
Molise 0.691 0.189 0.248 186.2
Piemonte e 0.821 0.221 0.472 260.03
Valle d’Aosta
Puglia 0.759 0.200 0.165 133.74
Sardegna 0.687 0.194 0.374 154.61
Sicilia 0.605 0.204 0.214 118.31
Toscana 0.838 0.218 0.36 241.43
Trentino 0.839 0.259 0.457 217.03
Umbria 0.768 0.215 0.398 213.39
Veneto 0.858 0.209 0.516 278.6
Average 0.760 0.205 0.344 215.33
Variance 0.0942 0.0248 0.1793 86.45
Pwcorr 1 0.644** 0.638** 0.746**
Table 1: Comparison among different financial development proxies
Notes: ** indicate that the pairwise correlation coefficient is statistically significant at 1%
level.
complemented by the other information in the survey, limiting the effects
of the cyclical financial trends and accounting for aspects of financial de-
velopment other than simply banking system lending.
As expected, the least developed area is the South and the Islands
(usually known as Mezzogiorno), while the Central and Northern parts
display an higher level of financial development. Moreover, it is inter-
esting to point out that Southern regions are less homogeneous in terms
of financial development than other areas, probably because this area is
















Figure 2: Financial development in different areas
than other areas.
1.5.3 The Dataset: a manufacturing sample
This work investigates the productivity growth of the Italian manufac-
turing sector. The analysis is performed at a firm level, using individual
balance sheet data provided by Bureau Van Dijck, which has been gath-
ering information on firms’ balance sheets since 1998. To avoid possible
problems relative to groups, the balance sheet are unconsolidated, and
firms belonging to groups are hence considered as individual units 8. The
database used in the further analysis includes 10,877 firms, observed ev-
ery year from 1998 to 2006. It is the result of a data cleaning process aimed
at keeping only those firms containing both the value added and the num-
8This seems to be relevant in order to have a correct sectoral based analysis. In fact, it
could be difficult to attribute a group to a specific sectors, as it can be composed by different
firms.
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ber of employees 9, which are strictly needed to calculate productivity.
This sample, including firms reporting results on the entire period, al-
lows to calculate each firms’ productivity growth during the period with
the same interval. In this way we avoid outliers generated by different
initial observations. Moreover, it is also useful to check the results using
instead of compounded annual growth rate, also average annual growth.
This should in principle guarantee, that the analysis is not influenced by
cyclical effects due to the chosen starting point of the interval.
Firm labour productivity is measured as firm’s deflated 10 value added
divided by its number of employees. From this variable the compounded
annual growth rate is calculated. Since the analysis is performed at sec-
toral as well as individual levels (at least for the more general robustness
test result), the compounded annual growth rate is then aggregated as the
median of compounded annual growth rate on each sector in each region.
1.6 Results
The first question to address is whether the Italian financial market is still
segmented in recent years.
As already stated the Rajan and Zingales methodology was applied within
Italian regions, using the financial development variable calculated from
the information from Capitalia Database.
In order to avoid the risk of endogeneity, regional financial development
was estimated on the three year period 1995-1997, immediately before the
period of this analysis.
As Table 2 clearly shows the results at sectoral level confirm the hy-
pothesis that there still exist a role for financial development in explaining
the regional growth differentials during the period considered. The inter-
action term between regional financial development and need of external
finance, computed by Rajan and Zingales on U.S. listed firms, is in fact
9Value added and employees are taken only when positive, assuming that negative val-
ues are effect of data entry errors.
10Nominal value-added weightings from the Groeningen Growth and Development Cen-
ter 60-industry database are used to calculate the average industry figures.
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I II
Share of Value Added -.065* -.063*
(0.022) (0.027)
Need of external finance USA * Regional financial 0.030**
development (Principal Component) (0.008)
Need of external finance USA * Regional financial 0.043*





Table 2: Effect of financial development on Productivity growth at sectoral
level
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
* indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.
positive and significantly (P-value of 0.01) related to the compounded
added growth value. The share of value added at the beginning of the
period is negative and significantly different from zero, as expected. Re-
laxing financial constraints, industries with less market share at the be-
ginning of period have the chance to grow faster than firms with a larger
share at the beginning of period. As said, regional and sectoral dummies
have been considered, to account for omitted variables common to part
of the observations. Most of them, even if not included in the table, are
significantly different to zero. The results are confirmed also using differ-
ent proxies for financial development. Comparing the results with those
obtained using Guiso Sapienza and Zingales financial development we
obtain pretty similar results.
The R-square is in both cases not particularly high, but it is in line with
previous similar research.
The robustness check estimating productivity at firm level data (see
Table 3) confirms that financial development is determinant also on in-
dividual productivity growth, affecting the differential in the results of
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All firms Constant Obs. R2
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development .017** 0.0008 10877 0.0225
(Principal component covariance) (0.000) (0.876)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development 0.025** 0.0016 10877 0.0221
(Guiso Sapienza and Zingales) (0.001) (0.768)
Table 3: Finance and growth using individual firms data
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
* indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.
firms belonging to different sectors and regions. However, in this case,
the coefficient associated to the interaction term is lower than before and
R square is very low, because the idiosyncratic component is more rele-
vant in explaining individual performance.
Small versus Medium and Large firms. Moreover, as expected, the re-
lationship is not significant for at least part of the sample: dividing the
sample in small and medium large firms11. The evidence indicates that
only the first group productivity growth is affected by geographical sup-
ply of financial services. The medium and larger firms, which are in Italy
a minority with respect to the number of Italian firms, are not dependent
on the financial development of the area. The coefficient of the interaction
term is neither significant with our proxy for financial development nor
for the GSZ one.
This result is in line with previous literature, confirming that size mat-
ters in looking for the best financial condition. A larger structure, in fact,
allows for a more accurate research of the financial services, even if the
supplier operates in more distant geographical areas.
11The segmentation considers the beginning of period number of employees and divide
the sample in small firms whenever they have less than 50 employees, and medium-large
firms, when they have at least 50 employees.
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Small firms (< 50 employees) I II
(less than 50 employees)
Share of Value Added .018 .019
of small firms (0.622) (0.621)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development .029**
(Principal Component) (0.008)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development .035




Table 4: Small firms productivity effects.
Medium-Large firms (> 50 employees) I II
Share of Value Added of
medium and large firms -.0743** -.0715**
(0.014) (0.018)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development 0.011
(Principal Component) (0.226)
Need of external finance USA * 0.015
Regional financial development (0.520)




Table 5: Medium and Large firms productivity effect.
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
* indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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The regression results in Table 4 indicate that financial development,
interacted with need for external finance, impacts on the productivity of
small firms (less than 50 employees): the coefficient is, in fact, positive
and significant. Vice versa, the share of value added is not significant
since small firms belong in the same extent to different sectors. The share
of value added in this case, is more concentrated in the lower part of the
distribution, and the results suggest that there is still room for growth in
most sectors.
Hence the relative dimension of sectors is not significant. On the contrary,
the share of industries value added for larger firms is more dispersed (see
Table 5): medium and large firms can generate bigger industries, reduc-
ing their potential growth. In this case the variable is, in fact, significant
and negatively correlated to growth. Those industries that have a larger
share of value added grow less than those smaller at the beginning of
period.
Analysis on different subperiods. The previous analysis suggests that
during the period from 1998 to 2006 regional financial development played
a significant role in explaining the differential in terms of productivity
growth among industries operating in different regions of the country.
However, we can imagine that the evolution of financial systems pro-
duced effects still not evident in the first part of the period analyzed. The
concentration of the industry, for example, is a process that needs a rel-
atively long period to be completely accomplished. To account for this
possibility, the exercise above is repeated over two subperiods: 1998-2002
and 2002-2006. Surprisingly, the results suggests that the importance of
geographical supply of credit has increased during the period of analysis.
The first equation, shown in table 6 indicates that during 1998-2002,
neither the industry share of value added nor the interaction term be-
tween the need for external finance and financial development are sig-
nificant in explaining differential results in terms of productivity growth
among industries operating in different regions. This is confirmed us-
ing both the principal component variable and the variable calculated by
Guiso Sapienza and Zingales (2004).
24
1998-2002 I II
Share of Value Added in 98 -.0736 -.0751
(0.166) (0.157)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development .004
(Principal Component) (0.833)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development .026





Table 6: Subperiod 1998 2002
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2002, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
The results in the second subperiod, shown in table 7 on the contrary,
indicate that during 2002-2004 the regional financial market was an im-
portant factor in explaining productivity growth: market segmentation
has, hence, increased from the previous period of analysis. The interac-
tion term is now significant and the coefficient associated to this term is
hence higher than the value on the overall period. This is confirmed both
using the variable generated through principal component and the one
generated by Guiso Sapienza and Zingales.
Moreover in this case, the hypothesis is tested also on the variable gen-
erated by principal component method, through the UniCredit survey
over the period 1998-2001. This should, in principle, capture the recent
changes in the regional financial markets that could have produced ef-
fects on productivity growth. The results are even more striking than the
previous, as the coefficient of the interaction term is in this case higher
than before, indicating that the recent evolution of the financial system
has not increased the real integration of regional financial system.
The share of value added is, in this setting, not significant, but this can
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2002-2006 I II III
Share of Value Added in 2001 -.059 -0.047 -.049
(0.270) (0.380) (0.361)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development .075**
(Principal Component 97) (0.000)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development 0.23**
(Principal Component 01) (0.000)
Need of external finance USA *
Regional financial development 0.095**
(Guiso Sapienza and Zingales) (0.010)
Constant -.036 -.036 -.034
(0.061) (0.057) (0.079)
Obs 474 474 474
R2 0.21 0.22 0.20
Table 7: Subperiod 2002 2006
also be the effect of the sample characteristics. Being that firms operating
along the whole period, we can suppose that they are increasing in size
during the period considered. As seen before a larger size implies a larger
share of value added not significant.
This evidence can be both the effect of the financial system recent evo-
lution or a change in the technological innovation used that affects the
industries’ need of external finance. The hypothesis that the need of ex-
ternal finance is the same between different countries is, to some extent,
questionable. This assumption is, in fact, based on the idea that financial
dependence is determined by technological reasons, that in the long run
are the same within different countries.
However, the Schumpeterian economic evolution assumes that innova-
tion is a discontinuous process meaning that different countries can be at
different stages of the technological evolution. This implies that indus-
tries’ needs for external finance can be at international levels, depending
on the country’s technological stage.
Before concluding that the segmentation in the Italian financial markets
has been increasing during the last years, we should avoid the possibility
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of a change in the firms needs for external financing, implied by a diffu-
sion of more innovative techniques.
It can be necessary to test if the role of financial development has changed
due to the diffusion of more innovative techniques. This could imply that
the financial supply is now less adequate to the financial needs of Italian
firms.
Using German need for external finance. To test if the change in the
impact on productivity growth is due to a change in the need of external
finance of Italian firms, it is necessary to calculate a new financial de-
pendence variable, that reflects more accurately the technology implied
in the production process. This variable is, then, computed for German
listed firms: Germany has, in fact, a productive structure pretty similar to
that of Italy, in terms of size of firms, relationships with banking system
and technologies adopted. All in all, we can consider this economy better
approximating the economic development stage of Italian manufacturing
industries.
As in RZ(1998), the variable is generated from the balance sheet of
German listed manufacturing firms12 as capital expenditure less self fi-
nancing over capital expenditure. Self financing is calculated as cash flow
from operation plus increases in inventories, and trade debt variation.
The results on the entire period are significant using our proxy for
financial development: the Guiso Sapienza and Zingales variable is no
longer significant. The interaction term using the principal component
method in estimating regional financial development is, on the contrary,
significant and its coefficient is now higher than before, suggesting that
the importance of regional financial development is even more relevant if
we consider a more realistic benchmark for an industry need for external
financing.
However, again dividing in two subperiods the sample, the results are
similar to what was suggested above. The interaction between the need
12The number of firms used to generate the variable are 119, and the financial depen-
dence is generated following RZ(1998) and using Bloomberg information on balance sheet
of German listed firms.
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I II III IV
Share of Value Added .011 .008 -0.48 0.54
(0.694) (0.407) (0.382) (0.175)
Need of external finance DE * Regional financial 0.205**
development (Principal Component) (0.014)
Need of external finance DE * Regional financial .033
development (Guiso Sapienza and Zingales) (0.407)
Need of external finance DE * Regional financial .260
development 98 (1998-2002) (0.101)
Need of external finance DE * Regional financial .257*





Table 8: German need for external finance
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
(*) indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the .5 % level, while (**) that
the coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level
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of external financing and financial development is significant only in the
second period.
This exercise suggests that in the period in the analysis the changes in
financial system have increased the distance among regions, negatively
contributing to the convergence process at country level.
All in all, the use of the German need for external financing shows,
firstly, that the USA industries financial dependence reduces the effect of
financial development on growth, since it implies the use of technologies
that are still different on the Italian market. Using another European in-
dustries financial development can at least partially correct this, since the
techniques are similar within the European countries. Then, it confirms
that the increase in market segmentation is not attributable to a change in
the technology used in the production process.
1.7 Simulation Results
To assess the differential growth implied by a more homogeneous finan-
cial services supply, a simulation analysis, based on Guiso Jappelli Padula
and Pagano (2001), is performed. The simulation results are obtained






∗ γ̂ ∗ Di ∗ (FER − Fr)] (1.2)
Where FER is the financial development level for Emilia Romagna,
which turned out to be the highest level in Italy. Here we are not as-
suming to increase the Italian financial development, but we consider
an homogeneous financial developed system in all Italian regions. The
results indicate that during the period 1998-2006 the annual growth dif-
ferential that would be spurred by an increase of financial development
at the highest Italian level (which is in the principal component variable
Emilia Romagna and in the Guiso Sapienza Zingales variable Trentino
Alto Adige) is between a minimum of 0.02% and a maximum of 0.27%,












































































Figure 3: Regional Differential Growth
The contribution in reducing the gap is, hence, quite relevant, if we con-
sider that the growth rate has been particularly low in the last years, as
already described above.
It is interesting to notice that not only the less financially developed
regions are those that would have the major benefits in increasing the dif-
fusion of financial services, but also those more specialized in innovative
industries. It is, for instance, the case of Lazio, which is one of the regions
benefiting more from an eventual increase of financial development. This
is due to the fact that the drugs industry, which is one of the more finan-
cially dependent, represents around the 25% of total value added of the
region. An increase in the total amount of financing resources can gener-
ate a better condition for the production in this industry.
Another effect of differences in financial development is in the indus-
trial specialization. Less financially developed regions are in fact, usually
more specialized in sectors less dependent on external financing.
At an aggregate level this can produce an over specialization. One of the
typical Italian characteristic is to be specialized in traditional sectors, less
30

















Trentino-Alto Adige 0.05% 0.00%
Umbria 0.06% 0.03%
Veneto 0.03% 0.07%
North West 0.11% 0.06%





Table 9: Simulation of regional productivity growth assuming an higher
level of financial development
Notes: the financial development benchmark in the principal component variable is
Emilia Romagna, while in the Guiso Sapienza Zingales estimate the most financially de-




















































































































































































Figure 4: Sectoral Differential Growth
innovative and, hence, less productive13. How the financial development
impacts sectoral productivity growth is valuable using the same simula-
tion as above, to quantify at large the potential sectoral annual growth
increasing financial development at the highest Italian level.
As before, it is possible to analyze what sectors would benefit more
from a financial development increase. Again, as in Guiso et al. (2001),






∗ γ̂ ∗ Di ∗ (FER − Fr)] (1.3)
From the simulation it turns out that the differential is higher for those
sectors characterized by high added value such as chemicals or electri-
cal and optical equipments, which are typically very innovative. Thus,
13On the Italian specialization dynamic see Faini, R. and Sapir, A. Un modello obsoleto?
Crescita e specializzazione dell’economia Italiana, in Oltre il declino, il Mulino,2005.
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a more efficient relation between firms and financial institutions could
overcome one of the most cited limits of Italian manufacturing sectors,
i.e. the overspecialization in low skilled labor intensive (traditional) in-
dustries.
1.8 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to describe the nexus between finance and
growth within Italy. By using the Rajan and Zingales methodology and
applying a new proxy for within the regions financial development, the
analysis highlights that financial market is still segmented in Italy. The
financial globalization process, in fact, does not rule out the specificity of
different areas. Hence, even though the last financial crisis clearly showed
that common rules and policies are needed, this analysis confirms the
importance of local banking markets. Operating in different areas has a
significant impact on firms productivity, as financial services differ from
region to region. This is not exclusively a problem on the supply side, but
also on the demand side. Firms are, in fact, not able to look for the best
financial service. On the one hand, this is related to the size of the firms
present on the Italian market, which are still too small.
As the evidence shows, not all firms are affected by local financial de-
velopment; on the contrary for medium and large ones, local financial
development does not determine their productivity growth. This is also
an issue of financial literacy: the size is in fact determinant in terms of
finding financial support, since it allows for a more complex structure
entirely dedicated to this activity. But important is also the capacity of
the firms to understand the best financial instrument for their needs. In-
crease in the competence in this direction is, certainly, an important task
for firms in the near future.
On the other hand, financial institutions should provide a better sup-
ply to the markets. As the analysis in different sub-periods demonstrate,
the process of concentration of the last ten years did not increase the inte-
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gration in the market. On the contrary, while local financial development
was not significant in explaining productivity growth in the period from
1998 to 2002, it becomes relevant in the following four years (2002-2004).
In this respect, we also tested the hypothesis that Rajan and Zingales need
for external finance (calculated on the USA market) can affect the analy-
sis since it could reflect a different stage of the development, which Ital-
ian market reached later on: the relation become significant, because of a
change in the firms financial needs.
With this aim, I took into account the same variable calculated for Ger-
many. It is interesting to notice that the sub-period analysis confirms the
results of the previous case, but with this specification it increases the ef-
fect on the productivity, suggesting that the specification of more realistic
needs of external dependence, increase the role of financial development
on growth.
All in all, it turns out from the analysis, that part of the diverging process
from 2002 onward affected the Italian Economy is explained by the dif-
ferent local financial development of Italian regions. From the simulation
exercise, in fact, we showed that, increasing financial development in the
highest Italian level (in our case Emilia Romagna), the differential growth
would vary from a minimum of 0.03% to a maximum of 0.28%, which is
not irrelevant when compared to the effective productivity increase.
In exploiting all of the Italian market’s potential, different territorial speci-
ficity should be taken into consideration, with the objective to generate an
homogeneous market: the banking system could be part of this process.
The concentration of the banking system during the last years, even if
it took beneficial effects on the general efficiency of the banking system,
could have a role in explaining the increasing distance in local develop-
ment. In fact, it reduced the presence of local banks (as banche popolari
etc.), reducing the direct relationship with firms. Furthermore, the intro-
duction of objective criteria and risk analysis in financing firms, which
is important for stability and liquidity issues, can introduce a distance in
the bank firm relationship if done at centralized levels.
This analysis, in my opinion, gives a hint to the relevance, in maintaining
the direct contact with firms within banking system. This is important, as
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seen, in exploiting local potential in terms of growth, through the financ-
ing of more innovative industries, renewing the productive sector and the
specialization of the economy.
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1.9 Appendix: Robustness Analysis
The robustness analysis is performed both on different methodology for
proxying regional financial development and on productivity growth cal-
culated as mean of annual growth rates.
Different Methods for Proxying Financial Development A possible al-
ternative in extracting the principal component of the financial variables
is to calculate the eigenvalue on the correlation matrix, instead of covari-
ance. This different procedure normalizes all variables before extract-
ing the common component and can be determinant when the distance
within the considered variable is significant. A benchmark case is added
here, which is the simple average of the 5 variables relevant for financial
development. The results, however are always in line with the previous
analysis, both using U.S. need for external financing and German need
for external financing.
I II
Share of Value Added -.063* -.064*
(0.026) (0.024)
Need of external finance USA * Regional 0.098**
financial development (0.008)
(Principal Component correlation)
Need of external finance USA * Regional 0.111**





Table 10: Alternatives methodologies in proxying financial development
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies* indicat-
ing that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the coefficient
is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Small firms (less than 50 employes I II
Share of Value Added of small firms -.020 .019
(0.592) (0.607)
Need of external finance USA* Regional .11**
financial develpment (Principal (0.003)
Component Correlation)
Need of external finance USA* Regional .116**





Medium and large firms I II(more than 50 employes)
Share of Value Added of m. l. firms -.0735 ** -.0740**
(0.015) (0.015)
Need of external finance USA* Regional .054
financial development (Principal (0.233)
component correlation
Need of external finance USA* Regional .062





Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
* indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Table 11: Small versus Medium and Large firms: alternative methodology
for proxying financial development
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I II
Share of Value Added in 98 -.053 -.0736
(0.316) (0.166)
Need of external finance USA * 0.025
Regional financial development (0.710)
(Principal Component correlation)
Need of external finance USA * Regional 0.019





Table 12: Subperiod 98 02: alternative methodology for proxying financial
development
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
* indicates that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Using as Dependent Variable Annual Growth Average In this robust-
ness analysis I tested if the chosen temporal interval strongly affects the
results of the analysis. I then used the annual growth rate and not the
compounded annual growth rate. This means that I calculated the pro-
ductivity growth rate in each year and then I took the average in the anal-
ysis. This avoid the possible problems coming from cyclical effects, and
related to the fact that in calculating CAGR, we only take into account
the initial and the end of the period value added, that can be sensitively
affected by the chosen interval. The results of these new regressions con-
firmed what was said above. The less comforting signal is relative to the
share of value added which doesn’t remain significant in all specifica-
tions.
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2002-2006 I II III
Share of value added in 2001 -.054 -.047 -.057
Need of external finance USA* Regional financial .24**
development (Principal component corr. 97) (0.000)
Need of external finance USA* Regional financial .273**
development (Principal Component corr. 01) (0.000)
Need of external finance USA* Regional financial .281**
development (Simple Average 97) (0.000)
Constant -.030 -.037 -.034
(0.109) (0.055) (0.067)
Obs 474 474 474
R2 0.21 0.21 0.21
Table 13: Subperiod 02 06: alternative methodology for proxying financial
development
I II
Share of Value Added in 98 -.005 -.005
(0.014) (0.838)
Need of external finance DE * 0.4*
Regional financial development (0.021)
(Principal Component correlation)
Need of external finance USA * Regional 1.32 **





Table 14: Germany’s need for external financing: alternative methodology
for proxying financial development
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
* indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Average annual growth rate I II III IV
Share of value added .032 .034 -.064 -.035
(0.219) (0.207) (0.026) (0.185)
Need of external finance USA* Regional .026*
financial development (Principal comp.) (0.011)
Need of external finance USA* Regional .093*
financial development (Principal (0.014)
component correlation)
Need of external finance USA* Regional .098**
financial development (Simple average) (0.008)
Need of external finance USA* Regional .039*
financial development (Guiso (0.027)
Sapienza and Zingales)
Constant -.015 -.012 -.014 -.013
(0.111) (0.169) (0.128) (0.140)
Obs
R2 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.15
Table 15: Using as dependent variable average annual productivity growth
Notes: The dependent variable is compounded annual growth rate in each firm of the
sample during 1998-2006, all regression include sectoral and regional dummies.
indicate that the coefficient is statistically significant at the 5% level, while **that the co-
efficient is statistically significant at the 1% level
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Chapter 2
Role of the Financial
System in Firm Efficiency
2.1 Introduction
The period from 1995 to 2005 witnessed a further deepening in the slow-
down of productivity for the Eurozone in general and for Italy in particu-
lar. Aggregate data show a negative growth for both labour productivity
and total factor productivity during the period 2001-2005 suggesting to
an unreasonable technical regression in the Italian economy.
An in depth analysis on Italian firms can actually help in understand-
ing whether in the last years firms have lost their ability to innovate or
if they have passed trough a restructuring in the production process in
order to compete at global level.
If we look below the surface, in fact, it seems that an aggregate level anal-
ysis hides the existence of a group of firms that apparently did not lose
their competitiveness even during recessions. Data indicates that dur-
ing the last years there has been a progressive polarization between two
groups of firms: one that keeps the levels of productivity high and the
other that is unable to find a way to maintain its competitiveness.
Hence, the problem seems to be related to the lack of incentives for the
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less productive firms to reach the efficiency of the group of firms that per-
form better. The analysis on microdata, in fact, suggests the fact that the
basic competitive mechanisms in the Italian market do not work. This is
partially explained considering that a lack of contendibility of corporate
control contributes to the lack of dynamism of the whole economic sys-
tem. It is well known that an efficient market for ownership is simply
absent: the stock exchange is particularly weighted in financial institu-
tions while the bulk of industrial and non financial service firms’ shares
are not publicly traded. This means that the takeover process could fail
in transferring the corporate control to a more productive management,
because it is not exclusively determined by market forces.
In economic literature it has been shown that the financial system, and
banks in particular, sometimes represent the way through which they
stimulate a selection of an efficient management (Hanazaki, Horiuchi 2000).
The relationship between the corporate sector and the financial system
can affect the aggregate efficiency through different channels. In this
work, after having shown some evidence confirming the weakness of
competitive pressures, we will investigate further this issue looking at
the distance from the efficient frontier (Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti
2003) of a wide sample of Italian firms, assessing the historical movement
of this distance and trying to give an interpretation of the role played by
the financial system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the first part we will
describe the main evidences coming from a micro level analysis. This
part aims at describing empirical evidence of Italian productivity both
using literature and evidence from a kernel density distribution analysis.
In Section 3 we indicate the motivation and main goal of the study. In
Section 4 we describe the efficiency frontier analysis methodology and
the database used in the analysis. In Section 5 the specification and its
main results are illustrated, while in Section 6 a robustness analysis is
provided. In Section 7 we provide a conclusion.
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2.2 A Look at Firms’ Behaviour
As already suggested by numerous empirical studies (Foster et al. 2001,
Aghion and Howitt 2006), aggregate productivity is the result of micro
processes of the reallocation of resources from the less productive units
in the market to the more productive ones.
The Shumpeterian Theory of Creative Destruction implies that this real-
location is due to the effects of new entrant firms, which embody new
capital, and then basically replace the less productive units. Through the
contribution of new entrants, this process contributes to the adoption of
new technologies in the system, replacing vintage capital. Nonetheless,
also the existing plants could, in principle, contribute to aggregate pro-
ductivity. The introduction of new techniques in their activity - through
new processes or new products - impose a retooling of the existing ac-
tivity, both in physical and human capital within and between plants.
Vintage models (Caballero and Hammour 1994) suggest that retooling
activity caused by new capital can introduce also retooling in employ-
ment: new techniques can, in fact, employ more skilled workers, gener-
ating change within and between plants.
A part from the effects of replacing technology, new entrants also have
an indirect effect on incumbents’ productivity: as Bartlesman et al (2004)
suggest, the creative destruction affects productivity through both reallo-
cation and market increased contestability, that promoting productivity
and enhancing strategies of incumbents.
Hence, aggregate productivity is the contribution of both new entrants
and incumbents. As several empirical works well resumed by Foster
Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) clearly show, aggregate productivity de-
rives from the combined result of entering and exiting plants, productiv-
ity growth of existing plants (within component), changing in shares of
most productive existing plants (between component), and a cross term
representing the covariance of the two cited effects.
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This kind of decomposition helps in understanding the official statis-
tical evidences, and also the cross countries differences in terms of ag-
gregate productivity. Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004) pro-
vide international comparison on microeconomic evidence of creative de-
struction process over industries. One of the conclusions they reach is the
role of post entry growth in productivity differential between Europe and
U.S.. The evidence suggests that part of the gap in terms of productivity
Europe faced in the last decade is due not to entry and exit rate, which
are pretty similar across industrial countries, but mainly to post entry
productivity growth.
These differences in post entry growth have also been pointed out in a
quite recent work by Philippon and Ve´ron (2006). As the evidence on
FT Global 500 ranking of the world largest companies shows, the Euro-
pean firms are generally old, and basically there are not many changes in
their composition. After 1975 only three European firms entered in the
500 global largest listed firms. This number is much more relevant for the
U.S., for which 26 firms born after 1975 are in the FT list. This suggests,
again, that in Europe there are relevant barriers to firms’ growth.
Looking at the productivity decomposition within European incum-
bents can be an interesting way to better understand where this gap comes
from and which are the countries showing the largest differences. On this
topic a recent work by Giannangeli and Gomes-Salvador (2008) provides
some interesting evidence. The analysis aims at disentangling the con-
tribution of learning, selection and cross terms to aggregate productivity
compared across countries in different industries.
Their results confirm the large heterogeneity of productivity at firm level,
as productivity enhancement are to be attributed mainly to within firms
effects, rather than to reallocation in terms of market share. The selection
effect, captured by the term representing the increase of market share of
most productive firms, is negative for each country, suggesting that no
premia, in terms of shares, is given to the best performers.
This evidence, that reiterate the lack of competitive selection forces in
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the European market, also suggests an important issue on the Italian mar-
ket: in fact, among the considered European countries1, Italy is the only
one displaying a negative learning effect.
The learning or within effect, in this kind of decomposition, represents
the process through which firms approach the efficient frontier, since it is
the contribution to aggregate productivity of each firm’s increase in pro-
ductivity. In the case of Italian market both the selection and the learning
effect are negative, suggesting that aggregate productivity is both due to
a scarce reallocation of market share to the most productive unit and to an
increase of distance from the efficient frontier. These results in the Italian
market are still confirmed for the period 1998-2006, as shown in a further
analysis by d’Alfonso and Giannangeli (2008).
However, a recent research (De Nardis 2007) seems to suggest that not
all Italian firms suffer from this bad performance: a bulk of enterprises
seem to have found their own way to compete. However, this good per-
formance (also in terms of productivity) is not reflected at an aggregate
level. However, if this statement is true, the productivity distribution
should in principle show a peak of best performers. To have an immedi-
ate view of the evolution of productivity in time, one possible approach
is to calculate its stochastic distribution.
2.2.1 Italian Productivity Distribution: a Stochastic View
The present analysis is based on a sample of 10,800 Italian balance sheet
data from Aida database of firms operating during the period from 1998
to 2006, for which the relative productivity has been calculated. In or-
der to calculate the relative efficiency of firms, following the Baily et al.
(1992) approach, we subtract the average value for the industry from each
firm’s labour productivity value. The industry average is calculated by
taking an average of the firms’ productivity levels weighed by their mar-
ket shares.
1This study is based on the Bureau Van Dijck Amadeus database, and it is performed on
the period 1993 2003.
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Figure 5: Relative productivity kernel density
p˜it = pit − Σitsit pit (2.1)
Where p is labour productivity calculated as deflated value added2
over total employees. For each firm the relative productivity is calculated
as its productivity less the average weighed for each firm’s share of value
added s.
It is natural to give a non parametric representation of the distribution
of firms’ productivity by recurring to kernel density estimates (Silverman
1986). But the availability of a panel structure suggests to extend the anal-
ysis to the distribution dynamics. The main references in this field can be
found in the literature on growth and convergence (Quah, 1996, or for a
very recent application Di Cecio and Gascon, 2008). In these works it has
been shown that a very suggestive representation of distribution dynam-
ics can be obtained by mean of a stochastic kernel. This object is a sort of
2The Groeningen database has been used to deflate value added: prices index have been














Figure 6: Relative productivity kernel density
non-parametric transition matrix in a continuum: it is obtained calculat-
ing the joint distribution of a phenomenon at time t and t + k and then
marginalizing it by dividing the joint distribution for the marginal dis-
tribution at time t. With this process one obtains the distribution of the
phenomenon at time t + k conditional on the distribution itself at time t.
The final product is a surface with time t and t + k on the abscissas and
a conditional probability on the ordinates. As for the interpretation, it is
clear that cutting the surface with planes orthogonal to the t axis gives the
probability distribution at time t + 1 of the values of the phenomenon of
interest, for an individual that is placed on that point in the t distribution.
Accordingly, looking at the whole surface a concentration of the mass of
probability along the principal diagonal suggests that the phenomenon
is pretty stable in terms of rankings (individuals that are placed at the
bottom of the distribution at time t have a high probability of remaining
there at time t + 1) just like in a transition matrix; if there a tendency of
polarization towards specific values of the distribution it shows up with
a high peak in the surface.
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The distribution confirms the results mentioned above, showing an
high persistence during the whole period, since firms are all concentrated
on the diagonal of distribution. Furthermore, as figures illustrate, a bulk
of firms remain in the lower part of the distribution, suggesting that less
productive firms remain in the market without significantly increasing
their productivity.
However, a smaller group of firms displays a behaviour different from
the others, outdistancing the mass of enterprises. This excellent group
has not enticed other firms to increase their productivity in order to com-
pete at the same level.
The absence of spillover from this group to the rest of the population is
further evidence indicating that good performers, as already pointed out
in other recent works3, exist at micro levels, but are still insufficient to
affect aggregate results, as they do not impact the performances of their
competitors.
2.3 What’s Lacking?
The absence not only of a selection process, but also of a learning effect,
suggested by existing literature, seems to offset completely the positive
results of the group of Italian firms that lie in the higher level of the ker-
nel density estimation described before. This evidence confirms a lack in
the mechanisms forcing less productive firms to increase their efficiency
to compete with the best performers in the market. Thus the technology
of more innovative firms is not transferred to the rest of the population,
since less productive units are not being pushed by market forces.
A big strand of literature has been concentrated on the role of institutional
factors in enhancing productivity growth.
Recent evidence suggests, for example, that the differences in productiv-
ity growth within OECD countries are attributable to the differences in
regulation, for instance differences in the stringency of product market or
3See also De Nardis, 2006.
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labour market regulation (Arnold, Nicoletti Scarpetta 2008).
Among others, an important institutional factor is the financial sys-
tem, as it impacts both entry and post entry growth barriers (Aghion,
Fally, Scarpetta 2008).
Financial development has an impact on productivity through the quan-
tity of funding it provides to the economy, but it also enables competi-
tion through its selection in allocating these resources. In this way, finan-
cial systems guarantees that firms receive the right incentives to produce
on the efficiency frontier (using all technology disposable in the market).
This role can be played either through capital market reallocation (typical
of arm’s lenght economies) or financing decision (typical of bank based
system).
In an arm’s length based financial system, the incentive to reach technical
efficiency comes, from performances in terms of firm value on the stock
markets: there is, in this kind of financial system, a sort of ’punishment’
to the management in operating far from the frontier.
In a bank based economy the process should be the result of the financing
selection: banks, that typically have a more direct information on firms,
should select through its credit choices (see Bencivenga and Smith, 1993).
Through a more intense relation with firms they are, in fact, able to eval-
uate and monitor firms and to allocate credit in more productive ways.
Hence, both mechanisms should, in principle, be part of the external in-
centives that induce the management to adopt the existing technology to
perform better.
As Habib and Ljunqvist (2000) specify, the managerial incentives for
firm efficiency are both internal and external: internal incentives are con-
trollable by the board of directors, and are for instance related with the
managerial stockholders and option plans. Conversely, external incen-
tives are determined principally by market forces.
Numerous papers have been concentrated mainly on internal incentives:
the ownership-control relation, as well as the managerial wage system,
have been at the center of corporate governance research.
49
Less developed is the analysis on the effectiveness of external incentives
on firms’ performances. The role of the market in stimulating manage-
ment to pursue efficiency is, however, not negligible. This paper aims at
understanding if a firms’ behaviour in their relationship with the financial
system is effective in enticing firms to increase their efficiency. Answering
this question should also suggest what kind of relationship between firms
and financial systems should be enhanced to increase market competitive
forces. To evaluate the role of financial system in boosting competition,
an efficiency frontier approach has been followed.
2.4 Efficiency frontier: model and data for the
analysis
2.4.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis: Methodological Issues
It is necessary to evaluate inefficiency in order to test for the role of finan-
cial system in explaining firms performances. To estimate the distance
from the efficiency frontier there are two main important techniques: the
non parametric one, called Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the
parametric approach, which relies on regression analysis. The first method
advantage is that it does not imply any hypothesis on the production
function, while the parametric approach needs a functional form of pro-
duction relationship to provide the estimate. Anyway, this second method
allows us to model factors explaining the inefficiency term, which is fun-
damental for testing the role of financial systems, which is the principal
goal of this work.
The stochastic frontier approach, firstly proposed by Aigner, Lovell
and Smith (1977), introduces the possibility of a non random error, which
represents the distance from the efficiency frontier not attributable to mea-
surement errors.
During the eighties, the estimation of the determinants affecting the inef-
ficiency terms were usually provided using a two stage approach: firstly
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the distance to the efficiency frontier was estimated, and then this term
was regressed on the variables explaining inefficiency. This approach
was however partially misleading, since this procedure contradicts the
assumption of the inefficiency effects independence in the two stage of
the analysis.
Several authors have hence addressed this issue allowing for a simulta-
neous estimate of the distance to the frontier and the error term specifi-
cation. In this paper the Battese and Coelli (1995) approach will be used:
their specification, in fact, permits the parametrization of the one sided
error term also in panel data estimates.
The general form of panel data production frontier can be expressed
as:
yit = xi,tβ+ eit (2.2)
where
eit = Vi,t −Ui,t (2.3)
with Ui,t ∼ |N(mi,t, σ2u)| and Vi,t ∼ N(0, σ2v ). V is, therefore a two
sided error term normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2v ,
while U is a one sided error that permits the identification of the frontier,
by distinguishing the efficient firms for which Ui = 0 from the inefficient
ones for which Ui > 0. The Ui are independently, but not identically
distributed as non negative terms of a truncated normal, in which it is
possible to model the average as:
mit = Zitδ (2.4)
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Where Zi is a set of variables that influence the inefficiency. In this
case maximum likelihood allows for the simultaneous estimate of all rel-
evant parameters.
The Battese Coelli (1995) model, implemented through their program
Frontier 4.1, ran the entire estimation and it also incorporated the ba-
sic test for the analysis, as the likelihood ratio, which tests for restric-
tions on the inefficiency term. A key parameter in the analysis is γ =
σ2u/(σ2u + σ2v ), which represents the relevance of inefficiency term in ex-
plaining the overall variance. This parameter is bounded between zero
and one: when it is close to zero the inefficiency term is null or negiglible.
Vice versa, the closer it is to one, the more appropriate is the stochastic
frontier approach.
Finally, the technical efficiency term of firm i at time t is calculated as:
TEi,t = E(Y∗i /Ui, Xi)/E(Y
∗
i /Ui = 0, Xi) (2.5)
which measures the observed output with respect to the efficiency
frontier. In stochastic terms this means to calculate the expectation of
Y∗ (effective output) conditional on input and the error term Ui over the
expectation of Y∗ conditional on input and assuming no inefficiency term.
2.4.2 Sample and Variables in Analysis
In this framework, we want to test whether firms with a more direct fi-
nancial market relationship operates closer to the efficient frontier or not.
We then estimate the previous model, using, as inefficiency’s explanatory
variable, data coming from the ’UniCredit Survey on Italian Manufactur-
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ing Sector’ 4. This database allows to link soft information, coming from
the questionnaire, to the data on the balance sheet.
The analysis is carried out on a sample of firms participating in the last
two surveys, covering the period from 2001 to 2006: the firms participat-
ing in both editions are 1,047, of which 1,044 disposed of all relevant ob-
servations for productivity function estimates for at least one year. Some
data cleaning had, in fact, to be pursued in order to cancel out problems
of missing values and outliers attributable to data entry errors.
The Frontier 4.1 procedure allows for missing values in the panel: the
sample, in fact, does not contain 1,044 firms each year, but the observa-
tions vary between 927 and 967, since data necessary to complete k, l and
y are not available in all observations.
To estimate the production function we use as capital total asset and
as labour the total number of employees 5. Total output has been con-
sidered total sales. The production function assumed for the estimate is
a Cobb Douglas, but - as a test for robustness - a translog has been also
carried out.
To explain the role of finance in contributing to firms efficiency we
want to consider both the effect of capital market and the role of bank-
firm relationship. In principle, in fact, both systems could obtain the best
allocation of savings in the economy, spurring productivity growth at
firm level: through the UniCredit Survey, we tried to evaluate all ques-
tions directly related to these issues.
In particular, in order to evaluate the openness in ownership - that means
allowing for competitive mechanisms on capital markets - three variables
are considered: being listed, intending to go public in the future and the
level of concentration in ownership (C1, share of the main owner). In a
certain way here we are testing if mechanisms, typically working in arm’s
4This survey has a long tradition, being before carried out by MCC and Capitalia, since
late 80s.
5To keep in count most number of firms for all years considered, whenever in the balance
sheet would be not specified the number of employees it has been substituted with that
specified by firms during the interview.
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Variable year Obs. mean St. Dev.
Output 2001 927 15.24 1.27
2002 953 15.27 1.31
2003 991 15.28 1.29
2004 967 15.30 1.27
2005 983 15.30 1.24
2006 944 15.32 1.29
Capital 2001 927 15.11 1.71
2002 953 15.12 1.69
2003 991 15.06 1.65
2004 967 15.05 1.65
2005 983 15.03 1.65
2006 944 15.00 1.65
Labour 2001 927 4.49 1.13
2002 953 4.53 1.13
2003 991 4.43 1.16
2004 967 4.43 1.14
2005 983 4.40 1.12
2006 944 4.39 1.15
Table 16: Production function variables
Note:Variables are in logarithms.
length economy, have an effect also on Italian market.
When the market for corporate control is developed firms managers and
ownership are motivated to reach the efficiency frontier. In general, the
Italian corporate sector is characterized by high levels of concentration,
and a tiny market for corporate control, a feature that could reduce the
effectiveness of competitive forces. If the hypothesis is true, then, firms
listed or more propens to open capital to a larger number of shareholders
should be in principle characterized by an higher efficiency.
It is well known, however, that Italy has a financial market principally
based on a banking system: understanding how the basic bank-firm re-
lationship works, in providing correct incentives to the market is an im-
portant tool for understanding the better evolution for financial system
relations. By all means the role of banking system in Italy is not directly
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Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Multiple Banking Relation 5768 6.38 3.75
C1 5768 59.71 28.40
Share of Main Bank Debt 5216 33.83 23.22
Long Run Debt for Investment (≥ 50%) 5768 14.10%
Listed or intending to go public firms 5768 4.23%
Table 17: Explanatory Variables Descriptive Statistics
related to firm choices (i.e. banks do not usually sit in the firms’ board
of director as in other economies), but it acts through the bank’ funding
decision. The intensity of the relationship can have, through this channel,
an indirect impact on the firms strategical decision.
With this aim other variables are considered in the analysis: first of all, the
number of banks that have a stable relationship with firm, as in principle
the less the banks are involved in activity, the stronger is the relationship
with the bank. Moreover, the share of debt provided by the first bank
should suggest the intensity in the relationship and it also should reduce
the effect of multiple bank-firm relationship. If, for instance, a firm is used
to raise funds through an high number of banks in order to find the best
condition of the market, but only one bank is the partner in the main part
of the activity, then it has a direct control of managements behaviour. Fi-
nally, also the long term financing for the investment (both in tangible or
intangible assets) is, in some ways, a proxy for indicating a long term re-
lationship. We expect when the relationship is more intense - less number
of lending banks, a larger share of debt in the main bank, and long term
debt - firms have smaller inefficiency.
The analysis tests for the correlation between inefficiency term and
firm relation with financial market. We are looking, in fact, not at the
effect of financial system on efficiency in general terms (i.e. quantity of
funding allocated to the corporate sector), but the analysis concentrated
on the behaviors of firms in relation with the financial sector.
A positive relationship between efficiency and intensity with the financial
market’s relationship can be interpreted as the effect of more strict control
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on firms performances, as well in the capital market as in the bank lend-
ing decision. This would imply a effectiveness of market forces, fostering
firms efficiency. Even if the causality direction would be the inverse, the
study would suggest that financial sector has an effect on the selection of
best performers. Firms, creating a more direct relation with finance are
signaling their efficiency to the market in order to obtain the best financ-
ing condition with respect to their business.
2.5 Results on Total Manufacturing Data
In the specification we will provide, all firms in the database are jointly
considered, to evaluate whether the issue we are testing is relevant for the
general firms. To take into account differences implied by different tech-
niques and results, dummies for sectors are introduced in the analysis.
The results of the analysis, in Table 18 show the significance of Cobb
Douglas coefficients, suggesting a constant return to scale of production
(sum of capital and work coefficient are close to 1). The results confirm
that the distance of firms to the frontier is not negligible: γ is significant
and close to one (0.96), and likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis.
The mean of technical efficiency, shown in Table 20, is increased dur-
ing the six years from 80.7% to 82.8%; however the mean of the period
remains quite low, since on average firms are producing at 81.8% of total
efficiency.
A part from the constant term, all variables described above are sig-
nificant. In detail, the number of firm-banks relationship is divided by
size (calculated as employees), and it is introduced in the regression both
in linear and in quadratic form. Introducing the variable in a quadratic
form, allows to evaluate if there exists a relation between number of banks
and size, under which reducing the number of credit institutions creates a
”trap effect” for firms. Conversely, as already suggested in Vulpes (2005),
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coefficients standard-error t-ratio
β0 Constant 9.17 0.06 161.09
β1 Capital 0.16 0.01 31.32
β2 Labour 0.86 0.01 115.58
δ0 constant -10.82 0.73 -14.72
δ1 share of principal bank/employees -0.01 0.01 -1.73
δ2 listed firm -1.43 0.20 -7.06
δ3 C1 0.01 0.00 8.80
δ4 long term investments -0.33 0.18 -1.78
δ5 banks relationship/employees -3.02 0.36 -8.50
δ6 banks relationship/employees2 0.83 0.10 8.07
Table 18: Frontier efficiency estimates
Notes: In the regression sectoral dummies are included to consider technical specificity
of different sectors: all of them are significant.
σ2 2.60 0.15 16.89
γ 0.96 0.00 309.21
LR test 1618.7
Restrictions 8
Table 19: Results of basic tests on inefficiency
Notes: The LR test is under the null hypothesis of one side error. The distribution is a
mixed χ2 as calculated by Kotte and Palm. The value of 2.71 rejects the null at 5% level of
significance.
above this threshold multiple banking relationship could be related with
the low formalized model of corporate governance adopted by the firms
and hence the multiple bank lending relationship could represent a sort
of insurance mechanisms for the banks in overcoming the difficulties of
assessing their customers firms. The number of firm-banking relation-
ships are, however, a proxy for the ability banks have in monitoring the
efficiency of the firm: in fact, if the firm has a low number of bank rela-
tionship, it means that banks could better value its business and perfor-
mance.










Table 20: Technical efficiency during the period
positive sign on the quadratic one, implying that the effect of multiple
lending relationships has a u-effect on inefficiency: it decreases until the
minimum, and then it starts increasing again. From our estimates it turns
out that the turning point is reached when the number of firm-banks re-
lationships is 0.13: above this value firms inefficiency starts increasing.
Clearly, the number of lending relationships a firm has, does not de-
scribe the intensity of the bank-firm relationship. This is better suggested
by the share of debt of the principal lending institution. Again this vari-
able is divided by firm size, as dimensions could imply different behaviours
in terms of indebtness choices and also in terms of bank firm relation-
ships, as seen before.
This variable is significant and negative, indicating that the more intense
is the relationship with the first-lending bank, the more efficient is the
firm.
In describing the characteristics of bank-firm relationships a relevant
issue is the lending term: a long term relationship gives, in fact, more
stability to a firm’s activity allowing for long run strategies. On the bank-
ing side, it represents a more in-depth evaluation of firm’s investment. A
variable indicating long term banking debt for financing investments is,
hence, added into the analysis of inefficiency terms. This term is included
in the analysis as a dummy equal to one when firms finance investment
with long term banking debt at least for the 50% of total investment ex-
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penditures.
The coefficient is significant (even if at 0.08%) and negative: a larger share
of long term banking debt in financing investments reduces the distance
to the frontier.
The results on these variables seem to indicate that a more direct relation-
ship with banking system positively impacts firms efficiency.
Furthermore, the other variables in the analysis suggest that less own-
ership concentration implies an higher level of efficiency. The share of
first owner (C1), is, in fact, positively correlated with the inefficiency
term. Moreover, when a firm is listed - hence controlled by the equity
market- or intends to go public in the near future - i.e. when firm is dis-
posed to share equity, enlarging the ownership structure - inefficiency is
reduced.
2.6 Robustness Analysis
To check the robustness of the previous specification some tests are pro-
vided.
First of all, it has been carried on a likelihood ratio test under the null hy-
pothesis of each explanatory variable being equal to zero. The likelihood
ratio has been calculated as:
LR = −2[LLF0 − LLF1] ∼ χ2 (2.6)
where LLF0 is the value of log likelihood function under the null hy-
pothesis and LLF1 represents the log likelihood function value under the
alternative hypothesis.
For any explanatory variable, the likelihood ratio test largely rejects the
null hypothesis of being equal to zero.
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For the variable representing multiple banking relationship, we tested
both the relevance of multiple banking relation (both the linear and the
quadratic term are equal to zero) and the quadratic relation with ineffi-
ciency (the hypothesis is that only the square term is equal to zero). In
both cases the test rejects the null hypothesis, confirming the role and
the path of the number of banks is relevant in explaining the inefficiency
term.
Furthermore, to keep in account the possible existence of a time trend
in explaining firms’ inefficiency, we add this term as explanatory vari-
able, and test for its relevance. The test rejects the null hypothesis of no
time trend, but including this term in the analysis the results previously
described are confirmed, with the exception of the dummy for listed com-
panies which lose significance.
The test on translog specification seems to indicate this production
function adequate for the data in the analysis. The results, however, are
not far away from the general specification. The variables that lose signif-
icance, showing lower robustness than the other variables in the analysis
are two: the dummy for listed companies, which is not significant with a
positive sign, and the dummy on long term banking relationship which
maintain the same sign, but lose in significance.
All other variables are significant, confirming at large the results on the
Cobb Douglas specification.
All in all the analysed specification seems to be reasonably strong. The
variable which shows less robustness is the dummy for listed or firms in-
tending go public, which however represents on average only the 4.2%
of the observations in the sample. In this case the scarce number of firms
can affect the robustness of the variable.
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Hypothesis H0 H1 LR
No Share of Main Bank Debt D1=0 -3034.10 -3021.01 26.18
No Listed Dummy D2=0 -3034.69 -3021.01 27.36
No C1 D3=0 -3033.50 -3021.01 24.98
No Long Run Debt for Invesment D4=0 -3031.60 -3021.01 21.17
No Multiple Banking Relation D5=D6=0 -3028.55 -3021.01 15.08
No Quadratic MBR D6=0 -3039.38 -3021.01 36.74
Time Trend D7=0 -3021.01 -3026.06 -10.09
Translog B11=B22=B12=0 -3021.01 -2871.89 298.25
Table 21: Likelihood Ratio Test
Notes: Test have a χ2 distribution under the null.
2.7 Conclusion
The study focuses on the relationship of firms with financial markets. To
proxy for it we used soft information coming from the UniCredit survey
on manufacturing firms, and we grouped two kinds of proxies.
On one side the variables indicating the attitude the firm has in terms
of openness to corporate control. The variables in the analysis represent
the presence of a firm in the stock market (or the intention to go pub-
lic) and the concentration index C1 (share of firms controlled by the first
owner). The results indicate that the firms more prone to open the corpo-
rate control are generally more efficient.
These results do not clearly work out the causality direction: it can also
imply that being the best firms on market, they tend to go public or to
share capital among a larger number of shareholders with the aim of in-
crease their financing sources. Certainly, in capital markets the control on
the firms’ performances is more effective, directly reflected on capitaliza-
tion value. Analogously, even outside the stock market, a worsening in
the efficiency should imply a lower firm value. The changing in share-
holder composition, and then in management, can be more difficult for
highly concentrated companies.
As the Italian market for corporate control is small, as well in terms of
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stock market capitalization and shareholders modification 6 it is also nec-
essary to consider in the analysis variables which represent the main char-
acteristics of firm bank relation.
The results of the analysis indicate that firms which have a stricter
relationship with the main bank are generally more efficient. This is eval-
uated trough the share of banking debt financed by the main bank (the
higher is the value, the lower the inefficiency) and the share of invest-
ment financed with long term banking debt. When this is higher than
50% of total investment it means that firms can rely on banks to enforce
their long term strategies: it generally charachterizes more efficient firms.
The last term used in explaining inefficiency is the number of relation-
ships firms have with banks, which deserve attention. The Italian bank-
ing relationship model is pretty different to the German haus banks or to
the Japanese ones. In these systems banks are directly involved in the
firm activity, even at the in the board of directors, their role is clearly to
substitute the stock market in allocating capital. This means that, when-
ever a firm is not efficiently managed, they can directly signal it to the
market.
On the contrary, the Italian system is characterized by multiple banking
relationships and generally banks are not involved in the operating ac-
tivity of the firms. This generally relaxes the intensity in the relationship
with firms and increases the opacity of the system. However multiple
banking relationships do not lower the efficiency level in a linear form:
depending exclusively on one bank can in fact reduce the financing op-
portunity for firms. There is, however, a maximum level of banks (con-
sidered not in absolute value, but in terms of firm size) above which in-
creasing the number of banks becomes inefficient.
This last set of explanatory variables suggests that also firms that rely
more heavily on their banking relationships are generally more efficient
6As numerous study on the Italian corporate sector indicate one of its characteristics is to
be highly concentrated: see Bianco (2003). Also in terms of stock market capitalization the
number of listed Italian firms is well below other industrialized economies.
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than others. This again, can be interpreted as a signaling phenomenon
of efficient firms that are interested in sharing their activities with banks
in order to get better financing solutions for their businesses. This also
means that, whenever banks are in condition of share information with
firms, their selection and monitoring activity is good. On the contrary ef-
ficient firms should not have any interest in tightening their relationships
with the banks as they could simply look for the best financing condi-
tions.
Alternatively, this evidence can also been interpreted as the effective-
ness of banks’ control mechanisms on firms (with respect to their per-
formances) when the relationship is more tightened. Firms with a more
intense relationships with the banking system receive an incentive to per-
form better. All in all this suggests, in both cases, that when firms dis-
close information, banks are efficient in allocating resources to the most
productive unit in the market.
However, the stock market or, more in general, a market for corporate
control seems to be still underdeveloped in the Italian economy, where
listed firms represent a minority, ownership concentration is very high
and consequently, there is not a large contendibility of corporate control.
On the banking side, the typical opacity of firm-banking relationship (al-
ready mentioned in the matter of multiple banking relationship) has been
probably overdrawn by a relaxing in the bank-firm relationship. The re-
sults of the ”‘X UniCredit Manufacturing firms”’ 7 suggests, for exam-
ple, that during the last years firms reduced, on average, the share of
debt with their main banks with respect to total debt. This is probably
attributable to the effect of banking concentration process, which could
have affected the perception of firms on their banking activity.
From a policy point of view, the suggestion is that the relationships
of Italian firms with financial markets are still characterized by a distance
which do not facilitate the monitoring on performances. Increasing the
transparency of firm activity and enabling better the selection process of
7Rapporto Corporate. Decima indagine sul settore manifatturiero Italiano. UniCredit 2008.
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lending activity can be a way for fostering efficiency in the market, and
through this, aggregate productivity.
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Chapter 3
Effect on Productivity of
R&D Financing Strategies
3.1 Introduction
The downturn in European labour productivity has been at the center of
economic debate in the last ten years: the increasing gap with respect to
U.S. has, in fact, been widening as time goes by.
Economists have identified part of the problem to the scarce innovative-
ness of European firms, inducing Policy Makers to introduce strategies -
also at EC level (i.e. Lisbon Strategy) - aiming at spurring innovation.
The loss of competitiveness with Italian firms in terms of productivity has
been even worse than other European economies, suggesting an higher
gap in terms of firms innovative activity.
Data on research and development investments confirm that Italian ex-
penditure for innovative activity is lower than the majority of other coun-
tries: in 2006 Italian gross domestic expenditure on R&D was 1.16% of
GDP against 2.1% of France, 1.75% of UK and 2.48% of Germany1.
Policies oriented to increase innovation are usually based on direct financ-
ing of research activity or reduction in financing costs.
A typical barrier to innovation is, in fact, determined by R&D financial
1Source of the data: Eurostat
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needs. As suggested by economic literature, financing research activities
(Hall 2002) is more complicated than financing ordinary activities. There
are plenty of reasons why those investments are more difficult to finance.
The most relevant being the existence of higher asymmetries on research
project or the higher uncertainty of the risk associated with the project.
The effect of different financing instruments on the innovative activity is,
however, not straightforward. The nature and duration of different fi-
nancial instruments could have an impact on firm strategies in terms of
innovation. In the presence of financial barriers, in fact, the instruments
become a driver for the firms’ choices in terms of research and develop-
ment.
Being aware of the effect of R&D strategic choices on firm’s performances
can be important in evaluating the role of different policies in spurring
innovation and then productivity.
The objective of this paper is, first of all, to understand the impact of
financing instruments on different R&D strategies: in particular the al-
ternatives to buying externally (BUY) or internally (MAKE) R&D activity
will be considered.
Then, we want to evaluate the the impact of different strategies on pro-
ductivity: with this aim a quantile regression approach is used to esti-
mate the effect of internal and external R&D on different percentiles of
the value added for employee distribution.
The paper is organized as follows: in the first Section a brief review of
the different strand of literature is provided; the second Section will illus-
trate the data used, followed by the analysis of model and relative results
described in steps and finally the main conclusions will close the paper.
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3.2 Literature Review and Statement of the Anal-
ysis
The analysis that will be presented further on follows different strands of
literature. First of all this work is related to the literature on innovation
and productivity linkages, that has been an important area of research for
a long period. In particular, the micro economic evidence on this topic
has received a lot of attention, thanks also to a relevant number of cross
countries comparable surveys on firms innovation activities. One of the
seminal works in applying a R&D model, innovation and productivity
interrelation is the Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998), which reaches
the main goal of pulling together the largely separated research on this
topic at a micro level.
They propose a model in three steps: in the first stage firms decide whether
to invest in R&D or not, the second step explains innovation output us-
ing innovation input, such as R&D intensity and other factors, finally, the
third step interrelates innovation with firms’ productivity through a Cobb
Douglas production function.
From this moment onwards, many empirical works followed this ap-
proach in analysing the innovation-productivity linkages using survey
data for different countries 2. In the Italian case, one of the main impor-
tant contribution is given by Parisi et al. (2006), who estimated the effect
of innovation on productivity and that of R&D on innovation using a
panel data from the UniCredit (ex MCC) survey. Their findings suggest
that innovation has a significant effect on productivity and R&D spend-
ing is strongly associated to the introduction of a new product, but not of
a new process.
Recently a paper by Hall, Lotti and Mairesse (2008) continues with the
analysis on Italian firms innovativeness, focusing in particular on the
SMEs activity.
In the present study, however, we want to test whether different R&D
2For an extensive survey see Hall, B. and Mairesse, J. Empirical Studies of Innovation in the
Knowledge Driven Economy, NBER Working Papers 12320, 2006
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financial instruments affect productivity. To this aim we apply a two stage
approach partially different from the above cited approaches.
The first stage of the analysis aims at understanding how different fi-
nancial instruments impact on the firms choices in terms of productivity.
The innovation projects are, in fact, particularly difficult to finance. As
Hall (2002) describes in her article, one of the main problems of financ-
ing innovation is related to the uncertainty of the returns on investment.
The investor’s required rate of return is higher in financing R&D. These
investments are, in fact, affected by market failures which generate a gap
between external and internal cost of capital. In particular there are three
important failures: asymmetric information between investors and re-
searchers, moral hazard of managers and, finally, the effect of tax incen-
tives on innovation activity. All these factors make it difficult to correctly
evaluate and monitor firms by the financial sectors, limiting firms’ inno-
vation activity.
The existence of constraints can induce firms to behave in their R&D
activities driven by the characteristics of different financial funds they
get. As suggested by Magri (2007) in the Italian market, small innova-
tive firms are generally financially constrained, because of informational
problems. Larger firms can innovate thanks to the use of traditional fi-
nancial instruments. This suggests that the market suffers from financial
constraints on innovativeness, since there are not instruments sufficiently
developed for this activity. The traditional funding used by innovative
firms, which are typically private equity and venture capital, are, in fact,
not very developed on the Italian market.
One of the main relevant characteristics of financial instruments is, for
example, the duration and nature of the investment. For creating inter-
nal R&D, for example, a firm needs to structure a department, hiring new
high skilled employees. This is clearly a project that involves the entire
life of the firm and its long term strategies. In such projects, the uncer-
tainty on returns are typically high, also because that are often related
to the knowledge embedded in the human capital of the employees that
could be lost if they would leave the firm. Clearly, this requires the in-
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vestors an higher rate of return which could induce the firms to privilege
internal financial source. On the contrary, outsourcing a part of the ac-
tivity can be less uncertain and associated to shorter run projects, and
external banking loans, for instance, could be a satisfying solution. More-
over this allows to make investments over time, considering step by step
the new information at risk.
However, different R&D strategies have different implication on the
innovation activities. In the second step, then, we analyse the effect that
different strategies (MAKE or BUY) have on the firms’ productivity.
One of the main problems in deciding whether to carry on research
externally relates with appropriability of its returns. In fact, internal re-
search reduces the risk of imitation or the purchase of the same innova-
tion by other competitors. This, as the survey confirms, can induce firms
to produce R&D exclusively internally. However, the possibility of com-
plementarities should not to be excluded.
A large part of literature (see Arora and Gambardella, 1990, Piga and Vi-
varelli, 2004, Lockshin et al., 2006), in fact, has tried to assess the impor-
tance of complementarities versus substitutability effects of external and
internal research, without reaching a unique conclusion in the context of
firm performance framework. Even if the theoretical literature considers
the two strategies as complementary, there are a number of arguments
stressing the complementarities between the two. The external innova-
tion is in fact more productive if a firm is able to absorb it through an
internal structure. Moreover, an internal structure seems to be necessary
in understanding when the firm needs the external R&D and to monitor
their activity and results.
The last part of the model, will hence try to evaluate the effects of the
use of different R&D strategies on a firm’s productivity. Through this
two stage approach it is possible to evaluate if financial instruments or
tax incentives for R&D can be a driver in a firm’s performance, in order
to understand whether policy makers should take into account the effects
of different tools for financing innovation.
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3.3 Data
The analysis is run using the UniCredit (ex MCC) database, that provides
both survey and balance sheet information from a sample of manufactur-
ing Italian firms carried out for the period 2001-2003.
This sample contains 4,289 firms representative of the universe of the
manufacturing sector; of these the 37.4% (1,609) invested in R&D within
the period. Since we are working on the choices in terms of Research and
Development investments, in further analysis, we will consider only this
subsample.
As expected, firms that invested in R&D are generally larger: small firms
(from 11 to 20 employees) investing in R&D are 27.7% and this share in-
creases to 85.5% for larger firms (more than 500 employees). The average
dimension of the firms in the sample we are employing is larger than the
average of the whole sample. The overrepresentation of larger firms af-
fects in particular low tech sectors, where R&D is less diffused. In high
tech sectors, on the contrary, R&D investments are diffused on the gener-
ality of firms.
The questionnaire asks for the amount of expenditure in research and
development in each of the three years in the examined period. Table 22
shows that the percentage in terms of total investments is 34.7% in 2001,
33.9% in 2002 and 36.1% in 2003.
Not surprisingly, the percentage of R&D invested in high tech sectors is
higher (40.7% 40.8% 42.8% respectively in 2001 2002 and 2003) than in low
tech sectors (30.5% 29.2% and 31.5%).
Clearly, investments in physical capital show the opposite relationship:
these are, in general, higher in low tech industries than in high tech sec-
tors.
The second information relevant for the analysis is the way the invest-
ments in R&D are implemented. In particular we investigated whether
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Total High tech Low tech
Mean σ Mean σ Mean σ
R&Dinv01 0.347 0.317 0.407 0.314 0.305 0.313
R&Dinv02 0.339 0.299 0.408 0.305 0.290 0.285
R&Dinv03 0.361 0.309 0.428 0.304 0.315 0.304
R&Dext 0.802 0.302 0.826 0.268 0.785 0.322
R&Dint 0.198 0.302 0.174 0.268 0.215 0.322
R&Drisk 0.007 0.077 0.009 0.087 0.006 0.069
R&DSel f f in 0.796 0.345 0.776 0.350 0.810 0.340
R&DBankDebtmktr 0.059 0.205 0.059 0.206 0.059 0.206
R&DBankDebteasyterm 0.034 0.153 0.040 0.164 0.030 0.144
R&DPublic 0.062 0.183 0.068 0.178 0.057 0.187
R&DFiscalincentive 0.029 0.126 0.032 0.127 0.027 0.125
l 4.30 1.12 4.38 1.18 4.24 1.07
k 12.66 1.85 12.63 1.91 12.67 1.81
Observations 1607 671 937
Table 22: Descriptive Statistics of variables
Note: Investments in R&D are in terms of total investments. R&D Strategy choices (ex-
ternal versus internal) and financing instruments are expressed in terms of total R&D
expenditure. Labour and capital are in logarithms.
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firms invest in internal or external structures. In general firms are more
inclined to use internal structures, and in fact, the share of external use of
R&D is on average 19% of total expenditure. This share increases for low
tech industries at 21.5%, while in high tech sectors, the preference for the
external sources of innovation is lower (17.4%).
Finally, firms are asked for the financial sources to R&D expenditure:
the possible alternatives are risk capital, self financing, long term banking
debt at market rate, long term banking debt on easy terms, public financ-
ing and fiscal incentives.
The use of different financial instruments confirms that external funding
is scarcely used for R&D activities: around 79.6% of total expenditure is
self financed, 0.7% is financed by an increase of risk capital - evidence
mainly related to the scarce attitude of Italian firms to enlarge their share-
holders composition - and only the remaining 18.3.% by external funds.
Whithin these, the main resources used are public financing and long
term banking financing.
3.4 Model and Results
In order to analyze the relationship between financing choices for R&D
and its effects on productivity we follow a two stage approach. With re-
spect to Crepon, Duguette and Mairesse (1998), we are not interested here
in focusing on the R&D effect on innovation. Their model, in fact, aims
to overcome the possible underestimation of the impact of innovation on
productivity, as firms can even innovate without investing in R&D.
Conversely, here we are wondering whether there is an impact of R&D
financing choices on firms strategies that can affect productivity.
This question implies two steps: given that all firms decided to invest
in research, in the first stage of this model firms have to choose among
investing their disposable amounts in external or internal structure and
what percentage of this amount to allocate to the different strategies. Given
that firms are financially constrained, we assume that they are not able to
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choose between different financial instruments. Conversely we test in
this stage whether obtaining different financial instruments has an effect
on the R&D strategic decision.
In the second stage, the nexus between productivity and R&D choice
is investigated (such as investing externally or internally in research) us-
ing a quantile approach.
3.4.1 Decision on R&D Strategy and Expenditure
Once a firm has opted to invest in research, the management should de-
cide how to allocate this expenditure. Our hypothesis is that the differ-
ent financing solutions used for R&D expenditure affect in some way the
strategic choices on how to carry on research activity.
One could argue that financing instruments are chosen in order to best
satisfy research choices. However, a large strand of literature (Hall, 2002)
suggests that financial constraints on innovative activities are tighter than
the ones to ordinary activities, as R&D investments implies larger infor-
mation asymmetries and more uncertainty on the results.
Assuming that firms are financially constrained in terms of R&D expen-
diture, implies that they have no chance to choose the best financing in-
strument for their research activities. Conversely, whenever they want to
introduce an innovation strategy, they are subjected to the quantity and
typology of the financial resources they get.
This would mean that, once they have decided to invest in innovation
through R&D expenditure, they must decide how to allocate this resources,
depending on the nature of the funds they receive.
The research activity can, in fact, be carried out by external structures
(i.e. university, research centers, other firms) or internal departments.
This part of the analysis aims at determining the factors that facilitate
one choice versus the other.
With respect to this decision, firms have to choose first of all between the
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different options and then, on the combination of total expenditure to al-
locate on each of them.
Literature has debated on the substitutability of these two options. Even
if a large part of the literature considers making or buying technology as
substitutes strategies, there are ample arguments stressing the comple-
mentarity of the two.
Hence the firm decides both whether to allocate externally the research or
not and how much to allocate in each of the alternative strategy. This ne-
cessitates a two stage approach. First of all, using a discrete choice model,
we will investigate on the determinants of opting for producing technol-
ogy or for sourcing it externally.
Following Piga and Vivarelli (2004), we will consider the decision to




1 if R&Dext/R&Dtot > 0
0 if R&Dext/R&Dtot < 0
(3.1)
where R&Dext is a variable that takes value one if the firm carried out
research using external structures and takes value zero when research is
produced exclusively by internal structures.
The estimation is performed using a probit model; as independent vari-
ables are included, the firm size and a dummy indicating whether a firm
is used to outsource part of its activity; a dummy for groups and sectoral
dummies have been firstly included, but then removed as not significant
in this stage of the decision. Finally we included financial instruments as
decomposition of total expenditure expressed in logarithms.
The results (see Table 23) indicate that long term banking debt, at mar-
ket rate as well as on easy term, are significant and increase the probabil-
ity of using external sources for technology.
Among public incentives for R&D expenditures, the one that has an ef-
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fect on the external production of research is free grant; fiscal incentives,
conversely, seem not to be significant in pushing the BUY strategy.
Also self financing and risk capital are not relevant in explaining external
R&D choices. These kinds of financial instruments, representing an inter-
nal growth, should be more appropriate for MAKE strategies, that imply
a more structured R&D activity within the firm.
The other two control variables, sizes and attitudes of a firm in outsourc-
ing part of the activity, are both relevant and positive in explaining R&D
choices. Firms that are, in fact, used to externalize part of their produc-
tion are more prompt to outsource research.
Main results are confirmed even when running the regression on the
two subsamples for the low and high technological firms, as classified by
OECD3. Some differences, however, deserve to be mentioned: size, for
example, is not relevant in explaining low tech firms behaviors, but it be-
comes significant for high-tech industries.
This suggests that, as R&D is not a core activity for low tech business,
firms operating in these sectors are more prone to invest all their R&D
expenditure on external structures. Conversely, in high-tech industries,
where innovation is a relevant part of the business, a BUY strategy is con-
venient only if a firm has already structured its activity, also in dimen-
sional terms.
The different financial instruments seem to have a direct effect on the
strategic choice of firms in terms of R&D. However, as already discussed,
also a R&D mix can be a relevant decision for firms who want to use ex-
ternal support in producing research.
The effect of financing sources have to be, then, evaluated also on the
share of external R&D on total R&D expenditure. We then estimate this
intensity as a linear model, by using the Heckman procedure, to account
for the above described selection effects (see table 24).
3See appendix for OECD classification, grouping the high and medium-high technology
sectors versus the medium-low and low-tech sectors.
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Total High tech Low tech
Outsourcing 0.247 0.227 0.275
(0.001) (0.045) (0.009)
Size 0.087 0.178 0.017
(0.003) (0.000) (0.670)
Risk Capital 0.004 -0.010 0.018
(0.888) (0.803) (0.655)
Self-financing 0.010 0.004 0.015
(0.249) (0.738) (0.188)
Long term bank debt (mkt rate) 0.027 0.043 0.017
(0.008) (0.006) (0.215)
Long term bank debt (special term) 0.041 0.028 0.052
(0.001) (0.117) (0.003)
Public Funds 0.041 0.032 0.049
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
Tax Break 0.012 0.006 0.017
(0.268) (0.693) (0.281)
Cons -0.706 -0.995 -0.494
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007)
Loglikelihood -1069.19 -437.00 -625.37
LR 88.25 55.66 41.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
R2 0.0396 0.0599 0.0319
Obs 1607 671 935
Table 23: Probit estimate results
Note: Group and sectors dummies have been excluded as not significant.
Firstly, we have considered as independent variables different finan-
cial instruments; none of the alternatives are, however significant in ex-
plaining the share of external R&D on total expenditure. This points out
that different financial instruments have a role on the decision to use ex-
ternal R&D, but not on its expenditure in relative terms.
These variables have, therefore been dropped, maintaining as explana-
tory variables of this second step the following: the total amount of R&D
expenditure, again the size, the relative role in the group (two dummies
are introduced in the analysis considering firms belonging to groups in
intermediate positions and one for subsidiaries) and a dummy equal to
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one for listed firms.
Total High tech Low tech
Intermediate group position 0.100 0.121 0.081
(0.004) (0.005) (0.136)
Subsidiary 0.078 0.070 0.096
(0.006) (0.059) (0.026)
R&Dexpenditure -0.055 -0.048 -0.052
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -0.033 -0.023 -0.047
(0.007) (0.208) (0.007)
Listed 0.193 0.162 0.243
(0.010) (0.082) (0.042)




Wald χ 106.26 50.11 59.63
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Obs 1581 658 922
Table 24: Heckmann estimate
Note: Group and sectors dummies have been excluded as not significant.
Total expenditure in research is negatively correlated to the external
shares of R&D. Firms that have lower funds to invest in are probably
constrained in terms of innovation strategies, as the resources to create
or enlarge an internal structure are more expensive than outsourcing the
R&D activity.
Interestingly, a firm’s size is negatively correlated with the share of ex-
ternal R&D used in production: being larger increases the probability of
”entering” in external R&D (they prefer at least a combination of internal
and external research), but increasing dimension decreases the share in-
vested in external R&D.
This evidence seems to suggest that larger firms are more prompt to use
external sources of innovation, but the external research is mainly con-
sidered complementary to the internal activity. As already suggested by
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descriptive statistics, firms are usually more inclined to produce innova-
tion internally. Clearly, internal R&D needs a structured activity, that can
be difficult to create in a small firm. In smaller firms with even bigger
financial constraints, external research can be the only way for producing
innovation.
The dummies representing the role of firms within the group, high-
light that firms in intermediate positions or subsidiary have an higher
share of external research. This suggests that in our sample, in group ac-
tivities the research department is generally in the holding company.
Finally, the dummy for listed firms is significant and affects external R&D
shares positively.
Once more the results are confirmed in both subsamples.
3.4.2 Effect on Productivity of Different R&D Strategies
In the next step of the model we want to evaluate the effects of different
R&D strategies on firms’ productivity levels. Assuming a Cobb Douglas
production function we estimate the following equation:
y = α+ β0k + β1R&Dext + β2R&Dint + β3ShareextR&D +
+β4Share2extR&D + β5group + β6...nSD + e (3.2)
where y is labour productivity (calculated as value added divided
by employee) of firm i, k is the investment in fixed capital, R&Dext and
R&Dint are respectively the expenditure for internal and external research
and development. All these variables are expressed in logarithms.
Moreover a variable representing the used mix of internal and external
R&D, i.e. the share of external R&D expenditure over the total, is in-
troduced in the analysis. This term enters the equation in quadratic form,
assuming there exists a maximum share of external research, above which
the relation with productivity invert its effect.
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Finally we introduced some control variables: the sectoral dummies and
a dummy for firms belonging to groups.
The estimation is based on a quantile regression approach. This kind
of methodology provides estimates on the linear relationships between
regressors and different quantiles of the dependent variable. This proce-
dure has many advantages: first of all it allows to consider the effect of
our independent variables on different levels of productivity and hence
to identify differences within productivity classes.
In this way it, furthermore, accounts for the heterogeneity of firms data,
which is another main advantage of this approach 4. In fact, as a method-
ology which considers the entire distribution, it doesn’t throw away the
outliers, but conversely, it gives information also on the more extreme
classes of productivity.
Quantile regression, introduced firstly by Koenker’s and Bassett (1978),
can be written as:
yi = x′iβθ − ei,θ (3.3)
with yi value added per employee, xi is a vector of regressors, β is
the vector of parameters associated to the θth quantile and ei the vector of
residuals.
The θth conditional quantile of yi given xi is:
Qθ(yi/xi) = x′βθ (3.4)
The necessary assumption is, thus, that Q(ei,θ/xi) = 0. The θth regres-
sion quantile , 0 < θ < 1, solves the following:
4On the advantages of using quantile regression in microdata see also Coad and Rao
(2007): they suggest, moreover, that relaxing the identical distribution of error terms allows







θ|yi − x′iβ|+ ∑
i:yi<x′iβ
(1− θ)|yi − x′iβ|
 (3.5)
In the regression described herein there is a lag introduced between
the investments (both in R&D and physical capital) and firm’s productiv-
ity level. We assume that the investment strategies for the period from
2001 to 2003 (on average terms) have a relevant effect only on the produc-
tivity level of some periods later, hence for the estimation 2004 is chosen.
A lag, in fact, is needed to make the strategies effective on the production
results.
The results in Table 25 on the median suggest that both physical and
intangible investments are relevant in explaining firms productivity lev-
els. Looking at the decomposition of research both externally and inter-
nally, it turns out that the MAKE strategy has an higher impact on pro-
ductivity.
In terms of mix between the two choices, the quadratic effect is signifi-
cant, pointing out the existence of a maximum level of external research
over the total, above which increasing the outsourcing of research has a
negative effect on productivity. This confirms the complementarity ef-
fect of MAKE and BUY strategies. The external research becomes optimal
when there is an internal structure able to implement the innovation in
the production.
Finally the group dummy suggests that being part of a group has positive
effects on productivity.
Dividing the sample into high and low tech industries, some differ-
ences in terms of innovation sources turn up. In high tech sector neither
the physical capital investments nor the external research investments are
relevant in explaining differences in terms of productivity. Only the inter-
nal R&D is the significant parameter in explaining firms’ performances.
Conversely, for low tech industries both the expenditure level in exter-
nal R&D and the chosen mix of strategies are significant in explaining the
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firms productivity levels.
Total High tech Low tech
R&Dint/l 0.026 0.034 0.021
(0.003) (0.014) (0.019)
R&Dext/l 0.001 0.001 0.02
(0.051) (0.869) (0.013)
share -0.392 -0.185 -0.575
(0.124) (0.621) (0.05)
share2 0.610 0.537 0.715
(0.019) (0.191) (0.012)
k/l 0.0491 0.017 0.071
(0.00) (0.293) (0.00)
Group 0.098 0.13 0.128
(0.00) (0.001) (0.00)
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.073 0.095
Table 25: Quantile estimate: results on median
Note: Sectoral dummies (Nace 2 digit level) have been included in estimate, and are all
relevant.
When we consider the results on different productivity percentiles
(Table 26), it turns out that the relevance of external R&D increases for
the most productive part of the distribution (those above the median).
It seems that complementing internal research with external activity is
particularly important for higher productivity levels. This suggests that
firms having higher productivity levels have internal structures sufficiently
developed to catch all possible spill-overs coming from external ones.
As suggested by the regression on the median percentile, this effect is
true only for low tech industries, while high-tech industries productivity
is affected only by internal R&D and eventually physical investments in
all percentiles of the distribution, except for the lowest level for which
only physical investments are relevant.
In the low-tech industries, using also external sources of innovation is im-
portant for all intermediate classes: lowest productive units, as before, are
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affected exclusively by physical capital, and the same happens for most
productive units.
3.5 Conclusion
The paper investigated the role of financing instruments on firms pro-
ductivity. The nature of financial instruments, in terms of duration and
implication on organizational structure, have effects on the firms’ choice
in terms of R&D production. Instruments as self financing or risk capi-
tal could imply, in fact, a change in dimensional or corporate governance
structures. Conversely, external sources of financing, being fixed in du-
ration, can induce firms to allocate the resources in order to obtain the
results within the period in which they receive the funds.
The way in which firms invest in R&D can affect their results in terms
of performance (here evaluated in productivity levels). From the litera-
ture it is not clear what kind of strategy (whether internal R&D, external
R&D or a mix of the two) is more relevant in terms of productivity. Some
authors have, in fact, pointed out the complementarity effect and others
the substitutability.
However, in a period during which the policy for spurring innovation is
considered a priority, it is relevant to evaluate in-depth both the role of
the different strategies on productivity and the effect on financing instru-
ments on their strategies. In fact, the way through which policy makers
usually stimulate innovation through the direct financing of innovative
activities or the indirect financing through fiscal incentives or public guar-
antees to long term banking debts 5. It is, hence, particularly important
to understand what kind of behaviours these policies are encouraging in
order to better understand their effects on the market.
From this analysis it turns out that internal R&D has an higher effect
5An example of this kind of guarantees has been introduced in U.K. with the SLBG pro-
gramme
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on productivity than outsourcing innovation. This is true, in particular,
in high tech industries. In low tech industries, however, the relevance
of external sources of innovation increases. The differences in quantile
regression, in fact, suggests that introducing also external R&D is deter-
minant for being in the most productive part of the distribution.
The conclusion is that complementarities between different strategies are
particularly important for those sectors, where research is not a core ac-
tivity. In these cases, although an internal structure is essential to catch
the spillover from the external research, the nature of business make pro-
ducing it internally less imperative.
Even if the role of innovation in these industries is less crucial than in
high tech ones, nevertheless it is a driver for increasing competitiveness
at international levels also in traditional sectors, as some case of Italian
excellence has shown.
In terms of effects of financial instruments on R&D strategic choice,
this work suggests that long term banking debt (either at market rate
or on easy terms) and public financing induce firms to use also exter-
nal R&D. On the contrary, solutions such as increase of risk capital, self
financing and tax breaks are mostly used for internally structuring a re-
search department. These instruments, in fact, imply a longer commit-
ment for the firm in terms of innovative activity.
The analysis points out that the role of different fundings have impacted
the decision of whether to enter in a BUY strategy or not, even if it has
no impact on the mix of the two strategies (represented by the share of
external research in total).
All in all, the results suggest that different financial instruments have
a different impact on the R&D firms choices and, as a consequence, on
productivity. As seen, alternative instruments can provide incentives to
different sectors. Being aware of this can be relevant for choosing policy
tools for spurring innovation.
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Total q20 q40 q60 q80
R&Dint/l 0.024 0.026 0.034 0.021
(0.003) (0.00) (0.00) (0.005)
R&Dext/l 0.004 0.008 0.012 0.013
(0.476) (0.187) (0.02) (0.016)
share -0.111 -0.269 -0.561 -0.803
(0.743) (0.446) (0.041) (0.036)
share2 0.209 0.368 0.826 1.152
(0.557) (0.318) (0.002) (0.007)
High tech
R&Dint/l 0.048 0.036 0.033 0.028
(0.024) (0.016) (0.012) (0.154)
R&Dext/l -0.003 -0.002 0.008 0.009
(0.780) (0.789) (0.235) (0.260)
share 0.270 -0.056 -0.567 -1.073
(0.624) (0.825) (0.132) (0.055)
share2 0.007 0.289 0.833 1.285
(0.991) (0.386) (0.065) (0.088)
low tech
R&Dint/l 0.018 0.025 0.029 0.019
(0.124) (0.01) (0.001) (0.183)
R&Dext/l 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.02
(0.152) (0.015) (0.001) (0.018)
share -0.556 -0.561 -0.583 -0.794
(0.398) (0.153) (0.099) (0.097)
share2 0.515 0.593 0.792 1.122
(0.41) (0.106) (0.021) (0.017)
Table 26: Effects of quantile regression by percentiles
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3.6 Appendix: OECD Classification of techno-
logical sectors
OECD classification
High-technology NACE Revision 1.1
1. Aerospace 35.3
2. Computers, office machinery 30
3. Electronics-communications 32
4. Pharmaceuticals 24.4
5. Scientific instruments 33
Medium-high-technology
6. Motor vehicles 34
7. Electrical machinery 31
8. Chemicals 24-24.4
9. Other transport equipment 35.2+35.4+35.5
10. Non-electrical machinery 29
Medium-low-technology
11. Rubber and plastic products 25
12. Shipbuilding 35.1
13. Other manufacturing 36.2 through 36.6
14. Non-ferrous metals 27.4+27.53/54
15. Non-metallic mineral products 26
16. Fabricated metal products 28
17. Petroleum refining 23
18. Ferrous metals 27.1 through 27.3+27.51/52
Low-technology
19. Paper printing 21+22
20. Textile and clothing 17 through 19
21. Food, beverages, and tobacco 15+16
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